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"(Llimitation of liability is not a matter of justice. It is a rule of 
public policy which has its origin in history and its justification 
in convenience. "(1) 
INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The rule that a shipowner can limit his liability to persons suffering loss or 
damage as a result of the negligent navigation of his ship is one of the most 
characteristic features of shipping law. In fact, it sets shipping apart from all 
other branches of industry and commerce. Its historical origin is based on the 
simple premise that it was deemed necessary to encourage the capitalist to 
invest money in the risky business of maritime ventures. The horrendous perils 
of the sea would have stifled the adventurous spirit of a shipowner who would 
have faced almost instant bankruptcy on the occurrence of a maritime disaster. 
In the interests of the promotion and flourishing of international trade, it quite 
simply came to be that maritime ventures had to be subsidised(2). 
The suspension of the general legal principle that if a person causes injury or 
loss to another by his negligent conduct or by that of his agent or servant, that 
person is liable to pay damages to the other sufficient to restore his former 
position appears at first sight to be unfair. However, given its origins in the 
early part of the 18th century, to a time when ships spent many months, 
sometimes years, away from their home ports, out of touch with the shipowner 
under circums~ances where the shipowner had very limited control over the 
Master and his crew, it becomes clear why the notion was considered 
necessary. 
(1) Lord Denning, Master of tho Rolls, in: The "Bramloy Mooro", 11964} p.20D at 220 (C.3.) 












Because navigation and shipping is essentially an international business, 
shipowning interests worldwide were anxious to make the laws governing 
limitation of liability uniform. To some extent this was achieved by the 
adoption of appropriate international conventions that could then become 
incorporated into national law and the initial work in this regard during the late 
1800's of the Co mite Maritime International (CMI) has been propagated by 
other international organisations such as the International Maritime Organisation 
(lMO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)(3). 
In 1908 the CMI had introduced a system which was designed to circumvent 
the problems which the international shipping community experienced because 
of the co-existence of several systems for limitation, coupleu with conflicting 
rules on choice of law which was clearly unsatisfactory. In effecting limitation 
unde, the 1908 system, the owner effectively had three choices: to abandon 
ship and freight or, secondly, to surrender the value of ship and freight at the 
end of the voyage or, thirdly, to pay the amount of 200 francs per ton for the 
satisfaction of all claims, property and person, relating to the voyage. 
Although attempts were hereby made to bridge the gaps between the major 
ruling systems, the .hree choices available to the shipowner gave him the best 
of three worlds(4). 
In terms of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, signed 
at Brussels on 25 August 1924, a similar compromise solution was adopted. In 
addition to claims for damage, the owner could limit his liability for salvage, 
contribution in general average, and for obligations under contracts entered into 
by the Master for the purposes of preserving the ship or continuing the voyage. 
The limitation fund comprised the value of the ship and freight or the aggregate 
of 8 pounds per ton, whichever was the lesser. Article 7 provided that where 
the owner was liable for damages arising out of death or bodily injury caused 
by the actual fault of the captain, crew, pilot or any other person in the service 
(3) Sae A H E Popp, .:lC "Limitation of Liability in Maritime Law· An Assessmont of its Viability From a Canadian 
Perspcctiv(," Journal of Maritime LAW and Commerce. vol. 24 no. 2. April 1993 











of the vessel in an amount exceeding the limit of liability referred to above and 
in Article 1, an amount of 8 pounds sterling per ton of the vessel's tonnage 
would be added to constitute the overall extent of his liability. In cases of 
collision or any other accidents and as regards all claims connected therewith, 
the value of the vessel was its condition at the time of her arrival at the first 
port of call after the accidentIS). 
It was the 1957 Convention on the Limitation of Liability of Owners of 
Seagoing Ships (itself based on earlier conventions), which provided the basis 
of the English legislation the following year, 1958, which saw the passing of 
the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act 1958 which 
established the then current rules by which limitation was to be controlled and 
governed. In terms of the provisions of that convention, a shipowner claiming 
the benefit of limitation was required to prove that the relevant damage or loss 
arose without his "actual fault or privity". This criterion can be referred to as 
the basis of the "former" law. 
While this second effort to bring about international unity in the field of 
limitation was hailed as a revision of the 1924 Convention, it was in effect a 
revised version of the British tonnage system. In terms of the 1957 
Convention the limitation fund is calculated on the basis of the tonnage of the 
ship and provides for one fund per accident or occurrence I6). The instability of 
world currencies after the Second World War had led to wide variations in the 
value of a fund from one state to another. As a result, it was envisaged that 
the amount per ton would be expressed in terms of gold francs of a specified 
weight and fineness, namely the Poincare Franc which is a unit consisting of 
65.5 mg of gold of millesimal fineness 900. The 1957 Convention extended 
the right to limit to owners, charterer, managers and operators of the ship as 
well as to the Master, members of the crew and other servants of the owners, 
acting in the course of their employment, in the same way as it applied to the 
owner himself. In addition, the financial limits were raised thus rP.aching a 
compromise between those states which had argued for a higher limit and 
those which had argued against. The solution was a huge success inasmuch 
(e;) Rein at pg 1268 











as more than 30 states acceded to the Convention with the USA and the USSR 
being two of the more notable exceptions. The 1957 Convention also extended 
the right to limit to claims for loss of life, personal injury and damage to 
property ashore, an area which was not previously covered in the legislation of 
the UK(7). 
At the International Conference on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims which took place in London between 1 and 19 November 1976 under 
the auspices of the IMO, it was generally agreed that the limitation figures 
contained in the 1957 Convention needed to be increased and that the 
circumstances in which the shipowner Gould be deprived of his right to limit 
needed to be reviewed. In addition the problems associated with the lack of a 
standard price of gold which made assessing its value under the 1957 
convention problematical, were sought to be overcome. The result saw a 
change in the whole method of calculation of the limitation fund by introducing 
the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund (lMF) as 
the unit of account(S) to resolve the competing requirements of claimants who it 
was felt should be suitably compensated for any loss or injury which they had 
suffered, on the one hand, and the shipowner, on the other, who it was felt 
should be entitled to limit his liability, for public policy reasons, to an amount 
which was readily insurable at a reasonable premium. The Convention of 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 which was promoted by the 
IMO and was based on a draft prepared by the CMI at its Hamburg Conference 
in 1974(9) heralded the introduction of a limitation fund which was as high as a 
shipowner could cover by insurance at a reasonable cost, and the creation of a 
virtually unbreakable right to limit liability. It saw the replacement of the actual 
fault and privity principle with one which can be viewed thus : limitation will 
only be removed "if it is proved that ~he loss resulted from the shipowner's 
personal act or omission. r.ommitted with intent to cause such loss, or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result"(10). The 
(7) Soo Article 1(l)(b) 
(S) Artie). 8(1) 
(9) See generally C N Cheka "Conduct Barring Limitation" Journal of Mnritimo Low ond Commerce. vol. 18 no. 4. 
Octobar 1987 











introduction of this test - far more onerous for a ciaimant wishing to defeat the 
shipowner's entitlement to limit his liability - can be referred to as the "new" 
law. The 1976 Convention introduces different limitation figures accordirlg to a 
sliding scale whereby the number of units of account changes in accordance 
with the increase in tonnage of the particular vessel. III ). 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN BASIS FOR LIMITATION: S 261 OF THE MERCHANT 
SHIPPING ACT AND THE ACTUAL FAULT OR PRIVITY PRINCIPLE 
It is not within the purview of this work to contrast in minute detail the 
principles of the 1976 Convention with those of the 1957 Convention. South 
Africa is not <l party to either of those conventions but enjoys its own tonnage 
limitation legislation in sections 261 to 263 of the Merchant Shipping Act, No. 
57 of 1951. In terms of those sections, an owner, charterer, person interested 
in or in possession of a ship, or a manager or operator of a ship, is entitled to 
limit liability to anyone incident causing damage based on the tonnage of the 
ship concerned. Section 261, in part, reads as follows:-
"( 1) The owner of a ship, whether registered in the Republic or not, shall 
not, if any loss of life or personal injury to any person, or any loss 
of or damage to any property or rights of any kind. whether 
movable or immovable. is caused without his actual fault or privity:-
(a) if no claim for damages in respect of loss of or damage to 
property or rights arises, I:;e liable for damages in respect of 
loss of fife or personal injury to an aggregate amount 
exceeding an amount equivalent to two thousand six hundred 
and thirty-five gold francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage; 
or 











(b) if no claim for damages in respect of loss of life or personal 
injury arises, be liable for damages in respect of loss of or 
damage to property or rights to an aggregate amount 
exceeding an amount equivalent to eight hundred and fifty 
gold francs for each ton of a ship's tonnage; or 
(c) if claims for damages in respect of loss of life or personal 
injury and also claims for damages in respect of loss of or 
damage to property or rights arise, be liable for damages to an 
aggregate amount exceeding an amount equivalent to two 
thousand six hundred and thirty-five gold francs for each ton 
of a ship's tonnage : provided that in such a case claims for 
damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury shall, to 
the extent of an aggregate amount equivillent to one thousand 
seven hundred and eighty-five gold francs for each ton of the 
ship's tonnage, have priority over claims for damages in 
respect of loss of or damage to property or rights, and, as 
regards the balance of the aggregate amount equivalent to two 
thousand six hundred and thirty-five gold francs for each ton 
of the ship's tonnage, the unsatisfied portion of the 
first-mentioned claims shall rank pari passu with the 
last-mentioned claims." 
(2) The provisions of this section shall extend and apply to the owners, 
buildl'lrs or other persons interested in any ship built at any port or 
place in the Republic, from and including the launching of such ship 
until the registration thereof under the provisions of this Act. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall apply in respect of claims for 
damages in respect of loss of life, personal injury and loss of or 
damage to property or rights arising on any single occasion, and in 
the application of the said provisions claims for damages in respect 
of loss, injury or damage arising out of two or more distinct 











(4) For the purposes of this section:-
(a) a gold franc means a unit consisting of 65,5 milligrams of gold 
of millesimal fineness 900; and 
(b) the value of such gold franc in South African currency shall be 
determined by the court seized of the case. 
The South African Courts have on only one occasion l12) had cause to consider 
these provisions, but inasmuch as the South African limitation legislation has 
retained the actual fault or privity principle, the focus of what follows will be 
on the type of conduct which will deprive the shipowner of the benefits of 
limitation under South African law, and thereafter will follow a discussion of 
the type which will deprive him of the benefit under Article 4 of the "new" law 
which, as mentioned above, has been incorporated into the English Merchant 
Shipping Act of 1979,113) reference being had to recent English decisions 
adjudged according to the new law. Indeed, the words "without their actual 
fault or privity" which appeared in Section 503(1) of the Merchant Shipping 
Act, 1894 on which Section 261 of the South African Merchant Shipping Act 
is based, are possibly the most significant and meaningful words in the entire 
scope and structure of shipping lawl14) and the precise extent to which the 
shipowner's conduct would deprive him of his statutory right to limitation 
depended and in South Africa continues to depend on the true construction of 
the terms "actual fault or privity". 
(12) The 1931 case of South African Railwnys and Harbours v Smith's Coastars (Prop.) ltd, 1931 AD 113 dealt with 
s. 503 of tho 1894 Act 
(13) Scction 17. schedule 4. Articlo 4 
114) Se. Hill ot pogo 84 
Seotion 603(1) road as foUows: 
"Tho ownOr3 of 0 ship, British or foreign, sholl not, whore all or allY of tho following occurrencos take placo 
without their actual fault or privity: (that is to savl. 
(a) Whore Any 10sIl of lifo or personal injury is caused to any person being carried in thD ship; 
(b) Where any damage or loss is caused to ony goods, morchandise, or other things whatsouver on board 
tho ship; ••.•.• " 
The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 as well as the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipown~rs and Othors) Act 
of 1958 were repealed in the Republic in 1960 in terms of Schedule 1 to the Merchant Shipping Act No. 57 of 
1£51 which came into force in 1960. Section 261 of the South African Act was modelled on Soction 503 of 











Lord Justice Willmer suggested in "The Lady Gwendolen"(l5) : 
"(The) test to be applied in judging whether shipowners have been guilty 
of actual fault must be an objective test." 
If the test is objective the question is this : how did this particular shipowner 
measure up to the standards of reasonably prudent comparable shipowners in 
the management and control of their vessels?(16) 
C.N. Cheka, writing in the October 1987 edition of Journal of Maritime Law 
and Commerce,(17) does not favour the objective test as it involves a 
comparison of the conduct of the defendant shipowner with that of the 
"reasonable man" without attempting to discover what went on in the 
particular case. He remarks that the degree of conduct required of the 
shipowner for limitation purposes is uncertain if an objective test is adopted, 
"objectivism being such a mythical test that a shipowner in a particular case 
could not readily, and in advance of a mishap and a court decision concerning 
it, tell what kind of conduct constituted a bar to lirnitation". Preferring the 
approach of a subjective test as enunciated by Lord Justice Buckley in the case 
of Asiatic Petroleum Co. Limited v Lennard's Carrying Limited(1S) in which it 
was said that the words actual fault or privity "infer something personal to the 
owner, something blameworthy in him as distinguished from constructive fault 
or privity of his servants or agents", Cheka holds the view that adjudication 
under the subjective test must be preferable because it envisages an 
assessment of the closeness of the connec\ion between the owner and the act 
or omission giving rise to the liability in damagesI19). 
It is submitted, however, that the test for limitation purposes is largely 
academic, given that the case law throughout the years has imposed on the 
shipowner various duties relating principally to the equipment of the ship and 
(15) (196412 Lloyd's Rop. 99 (Adm. Oiv.): oppool dlsmissod (196511 L1oyd's Rap. 335IC.A.) 
(16) Sweet & Maxwell p 169 
(17) See footnote 4 above 
(IS) 11915) AC 705 affirming (19141 1 K.B. 419 at 432IC.A.) 











its navigation. The more vexing question and one which flows logically from 
the subjective approach, namely whose actions can be considered to be those 
of the shipowner himself in the modern day complexities of mammoth shipping 
corporations, subsidiary companies, consortia and joint ventures, merits more 
illustration and discussion. What depth of investigation does an owner have to 
undertake into the detailed running of his ships and how much responsibility 
can be delegated to his subordinates? 
Formerly, the shipowner seemed entitled to limit his liability where the fault 
was navigational since navigation was a matter necessarily left in the hands of 
the master, officers and crew. However, in the watershed decision of "The 
Norman"1201 that trawler had sunk with loss of life after striking an unchartered 
rock at night in fog in newly exploited fishing grounds in Danish territorial 
waters off the coast of Greenland. The dependents of the deceased crew 
members alleged that the owners were at fault in failing to provide adequate 
navigational equipment. The evidence was that a practice had developed in 
terms of which the insurers of the "Norman" and other trawlers issued circulars 
about navigational hazards in fishing grounds, a practice which had been 
followed in the case of the "Norman" up to the time of her sailing. The 
evidence showed that whilst the "Norman" was at sea, her owners received 
information about the presence of a previously unchartered rock off the 
Greenland coast. The owners contended that to have radioed the new 
information to the "Norman" "would have been an unnecessary departure from 
their normal practice of waiting untii the respective ship came back to port"1211. 
They contended further that had they thought it necessary, their insurers would 
have sent out a general warning to all trawlers in the area and that they, as 
owners, were entitled to rely upon the judgment of their insurers. Moreover, 
sending out the information, thay argued, was unnecessary because not only 
was the rock in waters already known by the skipper to be unsafe but was also 
within territorial waters in which the "Norman" had been forbidden to go. The 
question in issue was whether the owners were at fault in not informing the 
Master of the "Norman" of the new hazards by radio communication, and if 
they were, whether this fault had been causative of the disaster. 
1201 [1960[ 1 lIoyd's Rep. 1 











The Court of Appeal held that there indeed existed such a duty on the part of 
the shipowners. They should have foreseen the possibility of the "Norman" 
being in the area in which he was at the time she grounded. Lord Radcliffe of 
the House of Lords affirmed the Court o' Appeal's decision holding the view 
that it was not so much a case of ensuring what could reasonably be foreseen 
as of enquiring what was the reasonable thing to do when little could safely be 
foreseen:-
" ... it was just as much a matter of routine, prudence and good care to 
send off a wireless message to the "Norman" as it would have been to 
send a copy of the circulars down to the dock if she had been there and 
about to sail"1221. 
It is submitted that the imposition of a duty to act which attaches when there 
is a reasonable likelihood of damage or loss is somewhat anomalous in that 
reasonable likelihood presupposes the existence of circumstances the precise 
nature and significance of which are often impossible to predict and only 
become manifest after the incident giving rise to the liability. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the "Norman" it became clear that the shipowner's 
duty with respect to navigation is, firstly, to foresee the geographical scope of 
her navigation, and secondly, to ensure that the vessel's crew is apprised of 
new navigational hazards within that area as a matter of routine prudence and 
good care. 
The case of "The Lady Gwendolen" reinforced the view that a shipowner has a 
duty to exercise some measure of supervision and control over the navigation 
of his ship. a duty which is not to be construed narrowly. In that case, to 
which reference will be had below in the context of the alter ego analysis of a 
company. a collision was caused by a vessel owned by Arthur Guinness & Co., 
brewers of stout, proceeding at too high a speed through fog. The owners of 
the "Lady Gwendolen" had delegated the management of the navigation of 











their ships to one Robbie, their marine superintendent. Robbie reported to 
Boucher, the traffic manager, and Boucher reported to Williams, the assistant 
managing director and member of the board who was in origin a chief brewer. 
The Court of Appeal held that the collision had not occurred without actual 
fault on the part of the owners, the fault which effectively caused the collision 
being found in the management of the navigation, namely in the control and 
instruction of the master of the vessel in terms of speed and the use of radar. 
The "lady Gwendolen" had collided with the "Freshfield" which was at anchor 
in the Mersey. Despite the fog, the "lady Gwendolen" was proceeding at full 
speed with her radar operating but not continuously manned, with the Master 
only occasionally glancing at it. The Master had been in the habit of sailing at 
excessive speed for some time and if the superintendent had examined the 
ship's log, as he should have done, he would have discovered that this was the 
case. Consequently, the failure of the superintendent to train the vessel's 
Master in the use of radar and in particular the failure to detect the Master's 
non-compliance with the Collision Regulations and to warn him that radar 
would not permit him to travel safely at full speed in fog, were omissions for 
which the assistant managing director and hence the company was 
responsible. It follows then, that the collision, which resulted from the vessel's 
excessive speed in fog, did not take place without the actual fault or privity of 
the owner as a consequence of which the owning company was denied the 
right to limit its liability. 
In the case of the "The Dayspring"(23) that vessel collided with a motor tanker 
off the Isle of Man. Her owners had kept standing orders displayed in the 
wheel house providing, inter alia, that at least two crewmen should be in the 
wheel house at all times and that a log book should be kept. Just prior to the 
collision, the mate, who had defective eyesight, had left the wheel house after 
sighting the tanker but failed to give instructions to the helmsman. It was held 
that the fault lay with her owners in failing to insist that log books were 
propf'rly kept and in failing to ensure that much more positive action was taken 
than the mere posting of a notice in the wheel house. Inasmuch as their 
breach of duty aforesaid was causative of the loss the owners were deprived 
of their right to limit their liability. 











A further decision which illustrates how far the pendulum had swung against 
shipowners is that of the "The Anonity"124). The "Anonity" was a small tanker 
which in April 1995 was lying at an oil jetty at Thameshaven. Her owners FT 
Everard & Sons Ltd had given instructions by letter that before berthing at such 
a jetty, galley fires had to be extinguished and there was to be a visual check 
to ensure that no sparks or other means of ignition would be a likely source of 
danger. In disregard of those instructions, the galley fire was kept alight a 
spark from which caused a disastrous fire. The Court of Appeal held the view 
that the instructions given in the circular letter were insufficient, and that 
"some arresting notice should have been displayed near the stove". The 
decree to limit their liability which the owners sought was accordingly refused. 
Sir Barry Sheen, in an address delivered on his retirement as chairman of the 
British Association of Average Adjusters in 1987 commented: 
"One cannot help wondering whether, if one of those judges had been a 
member of the board of directors of FT Everard & Sons before the incident 
in question and if he had been asked whether he had given instructions to 
extinguish galley fires before berthing at an oil berth, his answer would 
not have been "Yes, we have sent a letter to the master of every ship". 
How many directors would have thought that such a step was 
inadequate?"125) 
Although the effect of the decisions referred to above appears to have been to 
diminish to a large extent the right of shipowners to limit their liability even 
when the direct cause of the casualty was the negligence of the master of the 
ship or his crew, it has been pointed out that those decisions can be justified 
on the basis that the ship owning industry had been given full warning, both by 
the underwriting industry and by wreck commissioners who had held enquiries 
into various casualties,126) of the consequences of not tightening up the 
management of their individual concerns and issuing strict instructions to their 
masters. 
(24) 11961} 1 Lloyd's Rep. 203 (Adm. Diy.) but cf. "The Diamond" 11906) P.282 where limitation was allowed in 
circumstances where a fire was due to negligent overheating of the galley stove by the crew. 
(25) See Sir Barry Sheen in "Limitation of liability: The law Gavo and the Lords have Taken Away", Journal of 
Maritime Lew and Commerce, volume 18 No.4. October 1987 











A further decision which illustrate~ how far the pendulum had swung against 
shipowners is that of the "The Anonity"(241. The "Anonity" was a small tanker 
which in April 1995 was lying at an oil jetty at Thameshaven. Her owners FT 
Everard & Sons Ltd had given instructions by letter that before berthing at such 
a jetty, galley fires had to be extinguished and there was to be a visual check 
to ensure that no sparks or other means of ignition would be a likely source of 
danger. In disregard of those instructions, the galley fire was kept alight a 
spark from which caused a disastrous fire. The Court of Appeal held the view 
that the instructions given in the circular letter were insufficient, and that 
·some arresting notice should have been displayed near the stove". The 
decree to limit their liability which the owners sought was accordingly refused. 
Sir Barry Sheen, in an address delivered on his retirement as chairman of the 
British Association of Average Adjusters in 1987 commented: 
"One cannot help wondering whether, if one of those judges had been a 
member of the board of directors of FT Everard & Sons before the incident 
in question and if he had been asked whether he had given instructions to 
extinguish galley fires before berthing at an oil berth, his answer would 
not have been "Yes, we have sent a letter to the master of every ship". 
How many directors would have thought that such a step was 
inadequate?"(251 
Although the effect of the decisions referred to above appears to have been to 
diminish to a large extent the right of shipowners to limit their liability even 
when the direct cause of the casualty was the negligence of the master of the 
ship or his crew, it has bean pointed out that those decisions can be justified 
on the basis that the shipowning industry had been given full warning, both by 
the underwriting industry and by wreck commissioners who had held enquiries 
into various casualties,(261 of the consequences of not tightening up the 
management of their individual concerns and issuing strict instructions to their 
masters. 
(24) 119611 1 Lloyd's Rep. 203 (Adm. Div.) but ct, "Thu Diamond" (1906) P.282 whore limitation WllS allowed in 
circumstances where a fire was due to negligent overheating of the galley stove by the crow. 
(25) See Sir Barry Sheen in "Limitation of Liability: The jaw Gave and the Lords have Taken Away", Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce, volume 18 No.4. October 1987 











Not only did the shipowner have to exercise certain duties with respect to 
navigation, he also had to equip his ship adequately. He had to provide 
effective gear(27), to insist on a vessel design that provided for adequate light(28) 
and, as has been noted above, to issue adequate and proper notices prohibiting 
the use of galley fires in oil jetties(29). 
In the case of "The England"(30) a collision occurred on the Thames, the 
evidence being that the Master did not have copies of the Port of London 
by-laws on board. This was held to amount to actual fault or privity on the 
part of the owners sufficient to expose them to unlimited liability. In the case 
of "The Alletta"(31) the Plaintiffs applied to limit their liability after a collision 
between their ship and the Defendant's ship, the "England" in the River 
Thames. The defendants argued thClt the collision was caused or contributed to 
by the actual fault or privity of the "Alletta's" managing owner in failing to 
ensure that the Master did not navigate the Thames without a pilot and in 
failing to supply the Master with copies of the relevant river by-laws. In the 
words of Willmer, LJ, the owner had displayed managerial ineptitude in the 
discharge of his duties: 
" .... in that he failed to take reasonable steps to see that the .. Alletta" 
was properly equipped with the necessary publications. That ... 
amounted to a fault on his part within the meaning of Section 503 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act. "(32). 
(27) The "Radiant", (19591 .2 Lloyd's Rap. 596 where !imitbtion was disallowed bocause ropes, lights Bnd goar box 
wero defective 
(28) See the HMS "Truculont",1195112 Lloyd's Rep. 308 at 319 whoro the shipowner wos hold privy to Q dosign of 
a vessel with inadequate lights. 
(29) "The Anonity". SilO footnote 24 above. 
(30) '197311 Lloyd's Rep. 375 
(31) 1197311 Lloyd's Rep. 375. C.A. 











But perhaps one of the most controversial cases to come before the House of 
Lords reflecting on the 1957 Convention and the actual fault or privity rule 
contained therein was that of Grand Champion Tankers Limited v Noroipe A/S 
& Others (the "Marion")(33). The Master of that Liberian Tanker ruptured an 
undersea pipeline when he dropped the ship's anchor while waiting for a berth 
at HartlepooJ. Oil companies who had an interest in the pipeline sued the 
ship's owners, claiming USD 25 million damages in respect of direct and 
consequential losses. The reason why the "Marion" came to anchor so close 
to the pipeline was that her Master was using an out-of-date chart. Although 
there was an up-to-date chart on board the "Marion", the Master omitted to 
take the elementary precaution of looking at the bottom left hand corner of the 
chart in use. Had he done so, he would have realised that the chart was out of 
date. The owners had long since delegated the operation and management of 
the vessel to English ship managers who had supplied charts to the ship. Their 
assistant operations manager held a master's certificate of competency and 
had 12 years experience with BP Tankers Limited. The Admiralty Court Judge, 
Mr Justice Sheen, hearing the application to limit, initially granted limitation on 
the ground that the acquisition and maintenance of the charts was the sole 
responsibility of the Master as was his negligence in using an out-of-date chart 
which was the sole cause of the incident giving rise to the liability for damages. 
However, neither he nor the assistant operations manager who had been 
negligent in not having out-of-date charts removed could be considered th" 
alter ego(34) of the company and accordingly the decree limiting liability which 
the owners sought was granted. 
The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords took a different view, however, 
holding that it was the ship manager's duty to ensure that there was an 
effective and properly supervised system of chart provision and maintenance 
and finding that such a system was absent in this case. This lack of an 
adequate system was highlighted by the fact that a Liberian inspectorate 
report, issued over a year before the pipeline incident and which drew 
particular attention to the lack of correct updating of charts, had not been 
acted upon. The House of Lords held that the owners were not entitled to limit 
(33) (1984) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 











their liability because the director of the company, who was absent on business 
in Greece, had not given instructions that he should be sent the report. He was 
not entitled to leave it to his marine superintendent who by implication, it was 
held, could not be relied upon. This case neatly illustrates the lengths to which 
the English Courts went to defeat a right which parliament had given to 
shipowners : the superintendent who had been the master of a BP tanker for 
12 years and whose qualifications were evidenced by his certificate of 
competency, was earmarked as someone who could not be trusted by his 
employers to use an up-to-date chart if they wanted to enjoy the benefits of 
limitation. 
From the aforegoing, it will be seen that where the owner is an ordinary 
person, determining whether or not there is actual fault or privity on his part, 
may not be too difficult. However, the position is clearly not so straightforward 
where, as in most cases, the owner is a company. Lacking physical form as it 
does, a company can never itself actually be at fault or privy and thus the 
actual fault or privity that 'Nill deprive it of the protection affordea by the 
limitation provisions can only be that of an employee or agent. Thus the 
question is: of which employee or agent can it be said that his act is the very 
act of the company itself? In Lennard's Carrying Company case(3S) Lord 
Dunedin, in his dissenting opinion, refused to uphold the proposition that the 
actual fault of the whole body of directors must be proved before a company 
could be found to have been actually at fault(36). However, Viscount Haldane 
laid down an approach, the alter ego analysis, which was consistently followed 
by Courts subsequently(37). Viscount Haldane said of a company:-
(35) 119151 AC 705 
(3S) See Michael Thomas at 1225 and Lennnrd's Carrying Cu. case at 715 to '16 
(37) See. for example, "The Stcamship", 119521 P.' whore the British Crown was denied ~he right to limit its liability 
in circumstances where the lights exhibitAd by HMS Truculent were insufficient, tho fault being that of the third 
aoelard, 0 responsible member of tha Board of Admiralty. who was or must ba doomed to hove be on awale of 











"[It] is an obstruction. It has no mind of its own ... : its active and 
directing will must consequently be sought in the person of somebody 
who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the 
directing mind and will of tile corporation, the very ego and centre of the 
personality of the corporation. "(J~\ 
The "fault or privity" of the company is therefore: 
"the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for 
whom the company is liable upon the footing respondeat superior, but 
somebody for whom the company is liable because his actiol1 is the very 
action of the company itself. "(39) 
This approach would seem to suggest that the alter ogo of a shipowning 
company must be found amongst the directors or at least the senior employees 
of that company. It also seems to suggest that a proper delegation of 
responsibility to a reputable management team would enable the shipowner to 
limit his liability. Where the day to day tasks of running a shipowning company 
are delegated to a reputable management company chosen by the shipowner's 
directors it would seem just, it is submitted, for the shipowning company to be 
entitled to limit its liability if the managers were negligent without the directors' 
knowledge. 
Whereas in Lennard's case the alter ego of the owning company was found not 
within that company itself, but in the person of the active director of the 
company that managed the vessel concerned who was found to be privy to the 
l!nseaworthiness which eventuated in a fire, in "The Lady Gwendolen"(40) the 
Court of Appeal, whilst adhering to the approach laid down in Lennard's case, 
indicated that it might be prepared to find the alter ego at a lower level in the 
(33) $ ••• ,713 
(39) See 713 to 714. At p 715 Viscount Haldane said: "I should be inclined to think thoro was enI'Jugh known about 
Lennard to show that, to use tho appollant's loarned counsol's own phmso. ho was tho alter ego company_ HI) 
was 0 diroctor of the company. I cun quito conceivo that a company may bo entrusting its business to ono 
director bo as truly roprosonlod by that ono diroctor as, in ordinilTY cases, it is represontod by the wh('~') board." 











management structL're(41 ). As has been mentioned, the owning company was 
directed by a managing director assisted by three assistant managing directors, 
each of whom was responsible for specific departments of the business. One 
such department was the traffic department, which included the running of 
three ships. A traffic manager headed the traffic department and he was 
assisted by a marine superintendent as far as matters concerning the 
management of the ships was concerned. Of these three men, only the marine 
superintendent had any knowledge or experience of ships, and he, as an 
engineer, had no navigational experience. While the obvious sources of fault 
lay with the Master and the marine superintendent, inasmuch as the traffic 
manager never displayed any interest in the navigation of the ships, and the 
supervision of the traffic department by the assistant managing director was 
limited to one interview with the traffic manager per week, the company was 
nevertheless found to be actually at fault. Lord Justice Will mer said:-
"At firslt sight it may well seem that this is an obvious case for a decree of 
limitation. The fault which brought about the collision was prima facie a 
fault in navigation, which would ordinarily be regarded as entirely within 
the pro-vince of the master of the ship ... the case set up by the 
defenda,nts in opposition to the claim for a decree in limitation was that 
faults in the navigation of the "Lady Gwendolen" were at least partly due 
to failure on the part of the management to exercise proper control over 
the masters of their ships. "(42) 
Lord Justice Winn said:-
"Two guiding principles are plain. First, an owner who seeks to limit his 
liability must establish that, although for the immediate cause of the 
occurrence he is responsible on the basis of respondeat superior in no 
respects which might possibly have causatively contributed was he 
himself at fault. An established causative link is an essential element of 
any actionable breach of duty : therefore, "actual fault" in the context 
does not invariably connote actionable breach of duty: an owner is not 
(41) (196511 Lloyd's Rep at 340 











himself without actual fault if he owed any duty to the party damaged or 
injured which (a) was not discharged; (b) to secure the proper discharge 
of which he 3hould himself have done but failed to do something which in 
the given circumstances lay within his personal sphere of performance." 
And so, too, did the case of "The Garden City" concern excessive speed in 
fog(43). On 19 March 1969 a collision occurred in the North Sea between the 
Plaintiff's vessel "Zaglebie Dabrowski" and the Defendant's vessel the "Garden 
City". The "Garden City" sank and was a total loss, as was most of her cargo. 
In a collision action in 1976 it was held that the former and latter vessels 
respectively were 60% and 40% to blame. The "Zaglebie Dabrowski" was 
owned by the Polish state shipowning organisation, Polsteam. The faults 
alleged were in essence similar to those alleged in "The lady Gwendolen" : 
failure to check on the navigational habits of the Master of the vessel. The 
chief navigator of Polsteam, a post reasonably similar to the post of marine 
superintendent in "The lady Gwendolen", was at fault but it was held by 
Staughton J that his fault was not the fault of Poisteam. The duties he had 
carried out negligently had been delegated to him and the only issue relevant 
was whether the system of management adopted by Polsteam, including that 
delegation, was faulty. It was not, and there was no actual fault on the part of 
Polsteam. This case supports the proposition that in circumstances where 
authority has been delegated one can only attribute fault to the owners if the 
system of delegation was itself a faulty one(44). 
Similarly, in "The Marion" it was made clear that a shipowner had a duty to 
exercise some measure of supervision and control over the navigation of his 
ship and this duty was not to be construed narrowly. No new principle 
emerged from this case. It was the last limitation action in English law under 
the old law, and it merely illustrated the lengths to which the Courts were 
preparr:d to go to defeat a right which parliament had given to shipowners. 
Commending on the apparent increasing willingness of the courts both to trace 
faults through the management structure to board level and to lay faults in 
r.avigation at the boardroom door, Michael Thomas in his article "British 
(43) Polish Steamship Company v Atlantic Maritime Co. ("Tho Garden City No.2") 11982} 2. Lloyd's Rap. 3S21Wont 
to the Court of Appaal. (19S412l1oyd's Rep 37 on a different point) 











Concepts of Limitation of Liability"(45) comments that in the 20 years preceding 
the adoption of the 1976 Convention into English law no shipowner had been 
granted a limitation action in England(46) in contested proceedings. 
The only reported South African case in which consideration has been given to 
the question whether the claimant's loss was caused without the actual fault or 
privity of the owner of the ship within the meaning of Section 261 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act. is that of Atlantic Harvesters of Namibia v Unterweser 
Reederei (the "St. Padarc..:l(4, : in terms of an oral agreement between the 
parties. the defendant undertook to tow an unmanned vessel owned by 
Atlantic Harvesters from Ijmuiden to Bremerhaven on the terms and conditions 
embodied in the Unterweser towage agreement. The plaintiff's vessel. the "St. 
Padarn". ran aground during the journey on 31 October 1983 when the towline 
parted as well as the emergency line. attempts at reconnection having failed. 
The plaintiff instituted a claim for damages. the quantum of which was by 
agreement fixed at R500 000-00 alleging breach of contract for failure to 
deliver the "St. Padarn" at Bremerhaven. In an alternative Plea the owners of 
the "Luneplate" pleaded that in terms of the provisions of Section 261 {1 lIb} of 
the Merchant Shipping Act No. 57 of 1951. their liability for damages was 
limited to an amount of R 9 051-86. 
After evidence had been heard. three issues remained for decision by the Court: 
(a) whether the defendant. through its servants. was in culpable breach of 
the said agreement. or was negligent. and whether such fault caused the 
loss sustained by the plaintiff; 
(b) the validity according to German law of a clause in the defendant's 
general conditions of towage excluding liability altogether; and 
{c} whether the loss of the tow of the "St. Padarn" was caused without the 
actual fault and privity of the defendant within the meaning of Section 
261 {1 )(b) of the Merchant Shipping Act. 
(45) Michael Thomas "British Concepts of limitation" (1979) 53 Tulane Low Review 1205 
(46) Ad 1229 











Having established that the defendant was clearly in culpable breach of the 
towage agreement and that clause 2(b) of the contract was invalid in terms of 
German lawl48), the Court went on to deal with the limitation issue. 
The owner of the "Luneplate" was a corporation with two managing directors. 
Immediately below them was a nautical superintendent, one Litwinski, who 
was not a director but who was, at his level, responsible for the sea towage 
and salvago department, the harbour towage and salvage department and the 
supply shipping department. It was his duty to keep the ships running and to 
keep them supplied with towing equipment and to superintend repairs. He 
visited each of the tugs every three months for inspection and his assistant 
would visit avery single tug once a month. Nautical equipment, the tow gear, 
the safety equipment and the general equipment would be inspected. The 
choice of towline and the manner in which it had to be connected to the tug 
was left entirely to the Master of the tug and would depend on all the 
circumstances of the particular tow which was being undertaken. The 
defendant contended that, as regards towing gear and stretchers in particular, 
the evidence revealed that it had a reasonably efficient system of management 
and supervision in material respects, one which sought to guard against that 
which was reasonably foreseeable I49). 
Van Heerden, J found that the grounding of the "St Padarn" and the failure to 
deliver her at Bremerhaven was the result of the fault of the Master of the 
"Luneplate". He furthermore found that actual fa! :~ ~r nrivity on the part of her 
owner had been shown in regard to its lack 'Of;. : .ion and supervision 
concerning (i) the inspection of towing stretchers: lli' ". fitress for use of 
towing stretchers; and (iii) the use of a polypropylenfl Ii:. a towing line; (iv) 
its lack of instruction to its masters to report on and comply with any 
qualification attached to the seaworthiness certificate of the object being 
towed I50); (v) its failure in appropriate circumstances to enquire as to the 
existence of any such qualification; (vi) its failure to prevent the 
(48) At a70G and 875G respectively 
1491 At 877 D 
(50) The certificate CIt tho Classification Society prohibited tho C0n11nOncoment of a tow if a wind of forco 6 or more 
prevailed. The tug captain had boen negligent in that he had misread the certificato as allowing the 











commencement of the towage notwithstanding that the Master had failed to 
comply with his obligation to report on the prevailing weather conditions; and 
(vii) its failure in appropriate circumstances to enquire as to tho weather 
conditions and the towing equipment being used in the circumstances(S1). The 
Court placed a heavy reliance on English authorities dealing with the actual 
fault or privity concept remarking that the reasons for introducing the limitation 
provisions in South AfricF.ln legislation appeared to be the same as was the 
case in English law. It thus seems likely that the questions of actual fault or 
privity, the bearing of onus and enquiries regarding the person of a corporate 
shipowner will continue in South Africa to be judged according to English case 
law dealing with the old regime prior to the incorporation in England of the 
provisions of the 1976 Convention. 
THE DEMISE OF ACTUAL FAULT OR PRIVITY AND THE INTRODUCTION OF 
INTENT AND RECKLESSNESS - THE 1976 CONVENTION 
At the conference in London in November 1976 from which the Convention of 
that year emanated, it was decided that the words "actual fault or privity" no 
longer afforded sufficient protection to shipowners. Shipowners were prepared 
to agree higher limits of liability in exchange for certainty of the right to limit 
their liability. The test as to what conduct would prevent a shipowner from 
limiting his liability was laid down in Article 4 of the Convention in these 
words:-
"A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that 
the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the 
intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss 
would probably result." 
It should not be overlooked that the phrase quoted above is a near verbatim 
adoption of Article 25 of the Warsaw-Hague Convention on the Unification of 
Certain Rules of International Carriage by Air, 1955,(52) of Article 13 of the 
(51) At 865 D to F 
(52) Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 as amended by Article 13 of the Haguo Protocol 1955 provide:) that: 
"The limits of liability spocified in Article 22 shan not applv if it is proved that the d"mage resulted from an act or 
omission of the carrier. his servants or agents done with intent to ciluse damage or recklessly and with 











Athens Convention,(53) Article IV Rule 5(e) of the Hague-Visby Rules(54) and 
Article 8, Rule 1 of the Hamburg Rules.(55) Whilst subtle differences exist in 
the wording of the abovementioned conventions (for example, the Warsaw 
Convention refers expressly to the acts of "the carrier, his servants or agents" 
whereas the Hague-Visby Rules refers only to the word "carrier"), Hobhouse J 
in "The Lion"(56) has stated that "it is clearly important and correct that there 
should be a consistent approach to the construction of similar Maritime 
Conventions using similar terms and expressing similar ideas". In fact, given 
that the 1976 Convention still provides that it is the "personal" act or omission 
of the person liable which will defeat the right to limit, it will still be necessary 
to consider in the case of corporations, whose act or omission will be treated 
as the "personal" act or omission which may defeat the right to limit. The alter 
ego concept will, it is submitted, still have to be applied in order to ascertain 
whose "action is the very action of the company itself". 
It is clear that in order to deprive the person liable of the right to limit, it may 
be proved that that person had the subjective intent (or mens rea) to cause the 
loss. Standards of reasonableness are not of concern. It must be shown that 
the person liable himself actively intended the loss and not that a reasonably 
competent or prudent person could not have failed to conclude that his act or 
omission would cause the loss.(57) In addition, it should be noted that the 
(53) Article 13 of the Athens Convention providos that: 
"The Carrier shall not be entitled to the benefit of tho limits of liability proscribod in Articlos 7 and 8 and 
paragraph 1 of Article 10 if it is proved that tho damage resulted from en act or omission of thB carrier dons 
wi!h intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledgo that such damage would probably result." 
(54) Article IV Rule 51a) of the Hague-Visby Rules provides that: 
"Neither tha carrier nor the ship shall be entitlod to th6 bonefit of the limitation of liobility provided fOf in this 
paragraph if it Is proved that the dam ago resulted from an oct or omission of tho carrior dono with intent to 
couso damage or recklossly and With knowledge that damago would probably rosult." 
(55) Article 9 Rule 1 of tho Homburg Rulos provides thot: 
"Tha Carrier Is not entitled to tho bonofit of tho limitation of liability provided for in Articlo 6 if tho loss, damo~" 
or delay resultad from an act or omission of tho corrior dono with intent to cause such loss, damogo or dalay or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, dnmage or delay would probably result." 
(56) [1990) 2 Lloyd's Rep at 149 











mental element, intention or recklessness as the case may be, is to be applied 
not to the negligent act but to the consequences, that is to say the loss giving 
rise to a liability for damages. The alternative to intent is recklessness, coupled 
with knowledge that such loss would probably result. The meaning of the 
words "recklessly" or "recklessness" has been construed by courts both in the 
United Kingdom and in South Africa in the context of the criminal law and more 
particularly with reference to the concept of dolus eventualis.(58} These words 
would appear to connote either carelessness or utter disregard of consequence 
with the result that the perpetrator is deemed to have considered neither the 
probability or even the possibility of a likely result. Perhaps the best guidance 
may be sought in the case of Goldman v Thai Airways Internatl2M1 Limited(59} 
which concerned the Warsaw Convention and in which Eveleigh LJ cautioned 
against the dangers of proceeding on the basis of constructions drawn from 
English criminal statutes when considering an international convention drawn 
up in a number of languages. In that case the Court of Appeal said that the 
word "recklessly" in Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention had to be construed 
along with the words "and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result". At page 700 it was stated : 
"An act may be reckless when it involves a risk, even though it cannot be 
said that the danger envisaged is a probable consequence. It is enough 
that it is a possible consequence, although there comes a point when the 
risk is so remote that it would not be considered reckless to take it. We 
look for an element of recklessness which is perhaps more clearly 
indicated in the French term "temerairement". Article 25 however, refers 
not to possibility, but to the probability of resulting damage. Thus 
something more than a possibility i:; required. The word "probable" is a 
common enough word. I understand that to mean something is likely to 
happen. I think that is what is meant in Article 25. !:'l other words, one 
anticipates damage from the act or omission." 
(58) UK cases: 
SA casos : 
(59) [19831 3 All ~R 693 
R v Caldwell 1982 IA.C.1 at 354 and R v LAwrence Stephen - (1982) A.C. at 520 
S v Nguhnne 1985 (3) SA 677 (AI at 685 0 











The meaning of privity in the context of actual fault or privity was considered 
in the context of the Marine Insurance Act in the case of "The Eurysthenes"(80). 
That vessel was entered with a P&I Club for Class I risks, and stranded during 
the course of a voyage. Her P&I insurers alleged that she WIJS unseaworthy 
and that they were not obliged to indemnify the shipowner if it could be shown 
that the vessel was sent to sea in an unseaworthy condition with the privity of 
the shipowner within the meaning of section 39(5) of the lIti"rine Insurance 
Act, 1906. The Court of Appeal held that, in this context, "privity" meant 
"with knowledge and consent" .:61) The test under the 1976 Convention is one 
of recklessness ... with knowledge that damage would probably result. Cheka 
argues for a subjective test of knowledge given that the conve tion ; aquires 
that the perpetrator's knowledge of the probability of damage as meant to be 
proved and not implied.(62) Indeed, whereas under the old law the burden of 
proof lay upon the person seeking to establish the right to limit it now appears 
that in terms of the 1976 Convention, the burden of proof has been placed on 
the ether side. Article 2(1) of the 1976 Convention states that ..... subject to 
Articles 3 and 4 the following claims , .. shall be subject to iimitation of liability" 
(emphasis added). 
This would seem to suggest that the right to limit applies autumatically unless 
evidence is produced proving that the party seeking limitation is party to 
conduct barring limitation within the provisions of article 4. Sheen J in the 
case of the "Bowbelle"(63) stated that specified claims were subject to limitation 
of liability unless the person making the claim proved that the loss resulted 
from a personal act or omission of the shipowner committed with intent to 
cause such loss or recklessly or with knowledge that such loss would probably 
result. It can now safely be assumed, it is submitted, that this imposes a 
heavy burden on the claimant. A case in point is that of "The Capitai1 San 
luis"(64), The circumstances giving rise to the litigation was a collision off the 
coast of Cuba between the "Capitan San Luis", and the plaintiff's cruiseliner 
(60) (1976) 2 Lloyd's Rep 171 
(61) See 179, column 1; 185. column 2; 188, column 1 
(62) See Choka at 497 
(63) (1990)1 Uoyd's Rep 532 











'Celebration" in 1989. In its defence and counterclaim to the plaintiff's writ in 
rem, the defendant alleged an entitlement to limit its liability pursuant to the 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1979 which had given effect to the 1976 
Convention. In their reply in defence to the counterclaim, the Plaintiffs asserted 
that the defendants were not entitled to limit their liabiiity in that:-
(a) they caused or allowed the "Capitan San Luis" to sail from Havana when 
it was known or ought to have been known that her electrical equipment 
was defective; 
(b) they failed to operate an adequate or any system of maintenance and 
inspection of the electrical equipment of the "Capitan San Luis" to ensure 
that her electrical equipment was in an efficient and working state when 
she was at sea; 
(e) they failed to dispatch to the "Capitan San Luis" in due time assistance by 
other vessels on learning that she had suffered an electrical blackout and 
was lying unlit and immobilised in the busy shipping lane off the north 
Cuban coast; and 
(d) they caused or allowed the "Capitan San Luis" to remain lying unlit and 
immobilised in the busy shipping line off the north Cuban coastl65) 
The liability for the collision having been settled on a 25% ("Celebration") and 
75% ("Capitan San Luis") basis, the defendants sought a declaration that they 
were entitled to limit their liability. The application was granted and the 
plaintiffs afforded an opportunity of investigating whether it had sufficient facts 
at its disposal to attempt to defeat the shipowner's right to limit. Dealing with 
the question of onus Clarke, J said I66): 
"Under the 1976 Convention the position is in my judgment very different. 
The shipowner merely has to establish that the claim falls within Article 2 
of the Convention. Once he establishes that, he is entitled to a decree 
limiting his liability, unless the claimant proves the facts required by 
(65) At 574, column 2 











Article 4. It is of course a matt~r for the claimant whether he wishes to 
investigate that question" (emphasis added). 
The formulation of intent and recklessness contained in Article 4 would seem 
to produce a result extremely favourable to limitation. It is quite clearly going 
to be far harder under the 1976 Convention to "break" limitation because the 
instances of recklessness or intention to cause loss must by their very nature 
be fewer under the actual fault or privity regime. 
LIMITATION AND "FORUM SHOPPING" 
One further aspect requiring consideration, is the choice of jurisdiction in cases 
involving maritime claims arising out of delicts and the impact that limitation of 
liability has on such a choice. A practitioner advising a client whose prospects 
of success in escaping liability altogether are not very strong will want to 
advise his client to seek a jurisdiction in which the limitation 'fund of the vessel 
is as small as possible and the prospects of maintaining his right to limit are as 
good as possible. The reverse is also true. It has been seen that different 
systems of limitation apply - the abandonment system (such as in the USA), 
the 1957 Convention where the limits are fixed by reference to SDR's, the 
1957 Convention which fixes the limit in gold francs (such as South Africa), 
and now the 1976 Convention which adds a fourth choice. Whereas in the 
case of most maritime contract claims the document giving rise to the claim 
(such as a charterparty agreement or contract for the sale and purchase of a 
ship) will undoubtedly contain a provision in which the parties make an express 
choice of governing law and jurisdiction, in the case of maritime claims arising 
out of a delict, the choice of jurisdiction frequently lies with the parties. Three 
recent English cases, one of which saw the charterers of a tug launching 
injunction proceedings to restrain the owners of a barge which had run aground 
off the Cape coast from continuing with proceedings in South Africa, bear 
testimony to this. 
In the case of "The Hamburg Star"(671 containers on board that vessel were 
either lost overboard or were damaged with consequent loss or damage to their 











contents just prior to discharge at Hamburg. The vessel proceeded to Cyprus 
where she was arrested. Against the furni:;hing of security, she was released. 
The defendants entered an appearance to defend and thereafter instituted 
proceedings in Cyprus claiming a declaration that they were not liable and in 
the alternative, a declaration that they were entitled to limit their liability. 
Cargo actions were thereafter instituted in the English Admiralty Court and the 
defendants applied for a stay of those proceedings on the basis that Cyprus 
was the more appropriate forum. It was common cause that the 1976 
Convention had no application in Cyprus, that jurisdiction applying the actual 
fault or privity test as enacted in section 503 of the Merchant Shipping P.et, 
1894. The issue in the limitation proceedings in Cyprus we;:; whether the 
limitation fund was calculated by reference to the 1894 act or by reference to 
the Merchant Shipping (LiabiliCy of Shipowners & Others) Act of 1985. The 
cargo owners asserted that the 1958 Act applied which would create a fund in 
the order of £ 3 million. The shipowners. on the other hand. asserted that the 
1894 Act was applicable which yielded a fund in the order of £117 000. In 
terms of the 1976 Convention, applicable in (;ngland, the fund was in the 
region of £2.4 million. Thus. it became apparent that if the cargo owners were 
correct they would be better off in Cyprus than in England but that if the 
shipowners were right, they would be much better off in Cyprus.,G8) 
The cargo owners argued that if the action was stayed in fClvour of Cyprus 
they would be deprivad of a "legitimate juridical advantage" by being deprived 
of the benefit of the limitation fund in England. This. they said. was a legitimate 
advantage because it flowed from an international convention to which the 
United Kingdom was a party and the only reason that the position in Cyprus 
was different was that Cyprus had not become a party to or adopted that 
convention despite the fact that it was regarded by the international maritime 
commLlnity as laying down appropriate principles for the limitation of liability. 
The shipowners, on the other hand, relying on "The Spiliada"(69) refuted the 
deprivation of a legitimate benefit and said that this could not be so because a 
juridical advantage of one party is a juridical disadvantage 0.' another party.(70) 
This case is somewhat inconclusive on this question in that Clarke, J found 
(68) At 408. column 1 
(69) Spiliadp_ Maritime Corp v C:msulex Ltd (Tho Spilil1do) : 19871 , Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL) 











other compelling reasons in support of his conclusion that Cyprus was not the 
more appropriate forum for the resolution of the disputes in the interests of all 
parties and for the ends of justice and thus did not firmly decide the application 
for a stay of the English proceedings on the basis of the limitation argument. 
The matter of Caltex Singapore Pte.Ltd. & Others v BP Shipping Limited(71) 
arose out of a collision in Singaporean waters between the "British Skill". 
owned by the defendants and a jetty belonging to Caltex Singapore. Ca/tex's 
claim was estimated at USD 10.5 million. BP had admitted liability for the 
collision in limitation proceedings which it had commenced in Singapore. The 
Singaporean Merchant Shipping Act gave effect to the 1957 Convention 
allowing a shipowner to limit his liability to an aggregate amount not exceeding 
in the currency of Singapore the equivalent of 1000 goid francs per ton 
provided that he proved that the relevant damage was caused without his 
actual fault or privity. The 1976 Convention. applicable in England. made 
provision for a significantly greater limit of liability but it would obviously be 
much n' ~:; difficult for Caltex to break the limit. BP brought an application for 
a stay of the action brought against them by Caltex Singapore in England on 
the basis that Caltex's claim should be heard and determined in Singapore. 
The plaintiffs contended that if they had to claim in Singapore they would be 
unable to recover the difference between their claim of USD 10.5 million and 
the Singapore limit of about USD 5.8 million. This disparity between Caltex's 
claim and the 1957 Convention limit which would be applicable in Singapore 
was regarded by Clilrke J as a special circumstance which may require that the 
action proceed in England. BP having established that Singapore and not 
England was the natural and appropriate forum for the trial of the action. As a 
result. the proceedings in England were stayed temporarily in order to enable 
the issues of quantum to be determined ir. Singapore. The question as to 
whether there should be a final stay was left for later determination:-
"In these circumstances in my judgment a plain~:ff deprived of the larger 
limit would be deprived of a legitimate juridical advantage. I am not sure 
that it is still appropriate to think in terms of "legitimate juridical 
advantage", but whether it is or not, I have reached the conclusion that 
the plaintiffs have established that to be deprived of the larger limit is a 











relevant special circumstance as a result of which justice potentially 
requires that the action be allowed to proceed in England" .t72) 
In Ultisol v Bouygues(73), Ultisol, time charterers of the tug "Tigr" brought an 
application for an injunction restraining Bouygues, the hirer of the tug on the 
SIMCO Towcon form, from continuing its action against Ultisol in South Africa 
on the grounds that there was an English exclusive jurisdiction clause in the 
Towcon contract. The litigation between the two parties arose out of the loss 
of Bouygues' barge "Bas 400" on 26 June 1994 when she stranded on the 
South African coast after the towline by which she had been attached to the 
tug parted. ana of the arguments advanced in support of the application was 
that if the merits were to be determilled in South Africa there was a ser:ous 
risk that a different and less favourable regime of limitati n of liability would be 
applicaJle. Ultisol submitted that in all likelihood the South African Court 
would apply the regime presently in force in South Africa, namely that laid 
down by the 1957 Convention, whereas in England the Court would apply the 
provisions of the 1976 Convention. On the facts of this case and on the 1957 
Convention, the limit of Ultisol's liability would be £ 80 000-00 but only if it 
proved that the casualty proved without its actual fault or privity. Under the 
1976 Convention, the !imit of Ultisol's liability would be £ 573 717 unless 
Bouygues was able to prove that its loss resulted from Ultisol's personal act or 
omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such loss would probably result. 
BOUygUf,:J, on the other hand, argued that it hoped to defeat Ultisol's claim to 
limit its liability on the basis that Ultisol would be unable to prove the absence 
of actual fault or privity. Clarke, J considered Ultisol's right to seek to limit its 
liability in accordance with the law of the chosen forum and thus under the 
1976 Convention as a potentially very valuable right particularly in view of the 
fact that there was a much greater risk that it would be unable to limit its 
(72) At 299. column 1 
Tho term "legitimate juridical advantage" emanated frt.m tho coso of MocShAnnon v RockwAta GlosS ltd (1978) 
1 All ER 6~5 IHL) where it was held that in order to ob~ain a stay of pro.:eedings. a defendant hod to satisfy tw'o 
requirements: namely (i) that there was another forum to whose jurisdiction he was amendable and in which 
justice could be dono between the parties at substantia!!v loss inconvenience and oxpense, and Iii) tho staV 
should not dl"prive the plaintiff of 0 Icgitimate personal or juridical advantago which would be availablo to him if 
ho wore to proceed in tho English Court. 











liability at all in South Africa, in which case it would be exposed to a very large 
claim, and it was a right of which Ultisol should not lightly be deprived. The 
court viewed this as a powerful 'factor in favour of requiring Ultisol to be sued 
in England .174) The application for an injunction was thus granted in favour of 
Ultisol. 
OTHER LIMITATION REGIMES 
Having discussed in some detail the general limitation regime applicable in 
South Africa and England, it is perhaps apposite to mention a number of other 
regimes that include limitation of liability for the benefit of the shipowner. 
j
., 
'. TIle Athens Convention. 1974 
The current international rules regulating liability for the carriage of passengers 
and their luggage are set out in the 1974 Athens Convention.(75) The 
provisions of the Athens Convention have not been adopted in South Africa, 
although a discussion paper has been distributed by the Department of 
Transport to parties in the industry designed to test the waters with regard to 
adoption of this convention. In addition to setting limits of liability for 
passengers and their luggage, the Convention establishes the basis of liability 
and fixes the conditions for breaking limitation of liability in Article 3. As in the 
case of the limits established for the carriage of goods, tile limits for the 
carriage of passengers and their luggage are subject to the overall limits 
established under the general limitation rules. The convention provides a limit 
of liability for death or personal injury per passenger of 46 666 SOR's which 
operates as a first stage of limitation in relation to each contract of carriage. (76) 
The Convention came into force internationally on 28 April 1987. In March 
1990 at an IMO Conference held in London, a new protocol was approved to 
enhance compensation and to establish a simplified procedure for updating 
limitation amounts. 
(74) Soe page 152, Column 1 
(75) The full name of the convention is the Convontion Rolating to tho Carriage of Passengilrs and Thoir LUQoogl), It 
replaced the earlier 1976 Convention on tho Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Corrisga of Passongers and 
Their Luggage. 











(ii) .sru;.tion 9(51 of the Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil Act No.6 of 1981 
The emergence of super tankers in the 1960's and a general perception that 
the provisions of the 1957 Limitation Convention did not provide adequate 
levels of compensation led to the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage of 1969 (the CLC). This convention imposes strict liability 
upon the registered owner of a ship carrying persistent oil in bulk as cargo for 
pollution damage resulting from a spill of oil from that ship.(77) This liability is 
subject to a limited number of defences: act of war, act of God, sabotage, or 
negligence of a government or other authority in the upkeep a d maintenance 
of navigational aids. (78) Substantially higher limits of liability were imposed on 
the shipowner than under the 1957 Convention. Article 8(1) makes provision 
for the breaking of the owner's right to limit, the actual fault or privity test 
being the relevant criterion. South Africa has acceded to the CLC but it has 
never been given the force of law in this country. Rather, the South African 
authorities have chosen to enact the Prevention and Combating of Pollution of 
the Sea by Oil Act No.6 of 1981 (the "Oil Pollution Act"). The Oil Pollution 
Act is purportedly based on the CLC but does not follow it word for word and 
in fact goes further in some respects than the CLC. In line with the CLC the 
only defences available to the shipowner are the those "outs" referred to 
above. The liability of the shipowner can be limited to 133 special drawing 
rights up to a maximum of 14 million SDRs. Section 9(5)(a) expressly 
excludes the provisions of Section 261 of the Merchant Shipping Act. If, 
however, limitation is broken on the basis of absence of fault or privity or if the 
claims exceed the limitation fund, then, depending on various criteria. recourse 
may be had by a claimant to TOVALOP and/or CRISTAL for further 
compensation. (79) 
(77) Soo Articlo 3 (1) 
(78) Sao Sweat & Maxwell ~lt pogo 144 and Article 312) of tho COllvontion 
(79) Tho Tanker OWnors Voluntary Agreomont ConcernIng liability for Oil Pnllution (TOVAl.OP) oxtonds tho cover 
provided by etc nnd Is olso based on strict liability, CHISTAL (A Controct Rogmding Q Supplomont to Tonkar 
Liability for Oil Pollution) was devised to proviae compansotion supplemontary to that available from tonker 
owners and bareboot charterers undor TOVALOP. In common with TOVALOP, CRISTAL was amended with 
"Heet from 20 February 19B7 to, amongst other things, substantially increaso tho amount of compensation 
availabla worldwide to those affected by an oil spill from a tankor carrying c:lrOO owned by 0 party to CRISTAL. 
Tho 1992 Protocol to tho eLC camo into force on 30 May 1996 for the original 10 states (Oc:nmark, Egypt, 
France, Germanv, Japan, Moxico, Norw6Y, Oman, Sweden and the UK). Tho 1992 Protocol til tho Fund 











(iii) The Hague-Visbv Rules 
In terms of section 1(1) of the Carriage of Goods by Bea Act No.1 of 1986 the 
Hague-Visby Rules(SO) as set out in the schedule to that act enjoy the force of 
law in South Africa(Sl). Whether the Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated in a 
bill of lading or whether they apply as a matter of statutory law, the ship or a 
carrier of goods is, in terms of Article IV, Rule 5(a), read with (e), entitled to 
limit its liability for any loss or damage to or in connection with the goods to an 
amount not exceeding the equivalent of 10 000-00 francs per package or unit, 
or to 30 000-00 francs per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, 
whichever is the higher. "Carrier" is defined in the rules as the owner or the 
charterer who has entered into a contract of carriage with a shipper. It has 
already been noted that there is no entitlement to the benefit of limitation of 
liability where the damage resulted from the act or omission of the carrier 
which was done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that damage would probably result. In addition, the shipper can 
defeat limitation by declaring and inserting in the bill of lading the value of the 
goods. 
The basis of limitation in the Merchant Shipping and Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Acts would appear to be the same in that they both refer to gold francs and 
they both define a franc as a unit consisting of 65.5 milligrams of gold of 
millesimal fineness 900.(82) Inasmuch as the date of conversion of the sum 
awarded into national currencies shall be governed by the law of the court 
seized of the case, it is arguable that the method of conversion that will be 
adopted in South Africa will, for practical purposes, be that which is used for 
the determination of the gold franc value in terms of the Merchant Shipping 
Act. In this regard, the reader is referred to the discussion in Part 2 of this 
work on the determination of the value of the gold franc for the purposes of 
the calculation of a limitation fund in South African currency.(S3) 
(80) Dorived from tho Intornational Convention for tho Unification of Cort{\in Rules of Low Relating to Bills of lnding, 
signod Ilt 8rus!:lols on 25 August 192.4 as amended by tho protocol signod at Brussols on 23 February 196B 
(81) Reading Section 1(1) of tho Carriago of Goods by Sao Act togothor with Article X of thG HnOuo·Visby Rules 
thoro Bro six typo~. of voyage which can bo identified to which tho Haguo-Visby Rules Apply: see LAWSA 
Volume 25, paragraph 165. 
(82) See Article IV (5)(d) of tho Hegua-Visby Rules 











(iii) The Hague-Visby Rules 
In terms of section 1 (1) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act No. 1 of 1986 the 
Hague-Visby Rules lSO) as set out in the schedule to that act enjoy the force of 
law in South Africa IS1 ). Whether the Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated in a 
bill of lading or whether they apply as a matter of statutory law, the ship or a 
carrier of goods is, in terms of Article iV, Rule 5(a). read with (ei, entitled to 
limit its liability for any loss or damage to or in connection with the goods to an 
amount not exceeding the equivalent of 10 000-00 francs per package or unit, 
or to 30 000-00 francs per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, 
whichever is the higher. "Carrier" is defined in the rules as the owner or the 
charterer who has entered into a contract of carriage with a shipper. It has 
already been noted that there is no entitlement to the benefit of limitation of 
liability where the damage resulted from the act or omission of the carrier 
which was done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that damage would probably result. In addition, the shipper can 
defeat limitation by declaring and inserting in the bill of lading the value of the 
goods. 
The basis of limitation in the Merchant Shipping and Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Acts would appear to be the same in th" t they both refer to gold francs and 
they both define a franc as a unit consisting of 65.5 milligrams of gold of 
millesimal fineness 900. IS2) Inasmuch as the date of conversion of the sum 
awarded into national currencies shall be governed by the law of the court 
sei7.ed of the case, it is arguable that the method of conversion that wiil be 
adopted in South Africa will, for practical purposes, be that which is Ilsed for 
the determination of the gold franc value in terms of the Merchant Shipping 
Act. In this regard, the reader is referred to the discussion in Part 2 of this 
work on the determination of the value of the gold franc for the purposes of 
the calculation of a limitation fund in South African currency.183) 
(SO) Doriv!ld from tho Internotional Convention for tho Unification of Certain Rulos of Law Re!ating to Bills of lading, 
signed at Brussels on.2.5 August 1924 as unlanded by tho protocQI slgnod at Brussels on 23 February 1968 
(81) F:6ocling Section 1(1) of tha Carriago of Goods bV Sao Act togethor with Article X of tho Haouo-Visby Rules 
thoro am six typos of vayag6 which can bo identified to which tho Haguo-Visby Rulos Apply: soo LAWSA 
Volumo 25, paragraph 165. 
(82) See Article IV (5)(d) of the Hngue-Visby Rules 











(iv) The HNS Convention. 1996 
The two oil conventions described above are confined to damage caused by 
"persistent" oil carried in oil tankers as cargo. At the Brussels Conference in 
1969 where the CLC was adopted, the IMO was encouraged to intensify its 
work on all aspects of pollution by agents other than oil. The result was an 
emerging regime of liability and compensation for the maritim3 carriage of 
hazardous and noxious substances (HNS). which has featured in the work 
programme of the Legal Committee of the IMO for the last 20 years. This 
result has been an instrument running into 54 articles containing rules on 
liability and compensation which will impose additional financial burdens on 
shipowners, importer.> of chemicals and their insurers for the benefit of the 
victims of marine accidents involving HNS cargoes which was submitted to a 
diplomatic conference earlier this year. The convention covers claims for loss 
of life or personal injury on board or outside ships carrying HNS and also loss 
or damage to property outside the ship. The convention further covers loss or 
damage as a result of contamination of the environment provided that 
compensation for impairment of the environment is limited to the costs of 
reasonable mdasures of reinstatement. The cost of preventative measures is 
also covered. The liability imposed on the owner in terms of this convention is 
strict, although a limited number of defences are available to the shipowner. 
The three defences available under the CLC apply as well as a fourth defence 
of which the shipowner can avail himself if he can establish that the damage 
was wholly or partly caused by the failure of the shipper to furnish information 
concerning the hazardous and noxious nature of the cargo or where the 
shipper's failure has led the owner not obtaining insurance cover in respect of 
HNS risks. The limits of liability are contained in Article 9 which also provides 
that the owner may lose the right to limit if it is proved that the accidp.nt arose 
from his reckless conduct and where he knew that the damage which occurred 
would probably result from his conduct. 
The convention envisages an equitable share between ship and cargo of the 
financial responsibilities for the consequence::; of an HNS spill. The HNS Fund. 
to which cargo interests will contribute, will only be called upon when the 
underlying fund provided by the shipowner based on the limitation figures 
proves to be insufficient to meet ail claims. The convention will enter into 
force 18 months after ;ot least 12 states. including 4 states each with a fleet of 











ratified the convention and the Secretary-General is satisfied that those pe!fsons 
in those states who would be liable to contribute to the HNS Fund have 
received, during the preceding year, a total of not less than 46 million tons of 
contributing cargo.(84) It is expected that there will be a reasonable time lag 
before the HNS convention comes into force internationally. However, the 
comments of national delegations at the recent diplomatic confe,rence 
reportedly left the distinct impression that there will be wide support fCtr this 
convention, particularly in Europe.(SS) 
(84) See Article 46 
(85) For more dotailed analysis of the conventions's provisions and its likely future, soo Patrick Griggs, (1996) 












LIMITATION OF LIABILITY tllND WRECK REMOVAL THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
On her first voyage trading the South African I West African route and just after 
midnight on 5th March 1996, the 3500 dwt "Spirit of Cape Town", owned by 
German based Atlantic Shipping slipped off the quayside beside the ccastal 
container berth at the Cape Town port with 83 containers on board, 11 of which 
were removed by the port authorities before she sank in 9.5 metres of water. 
During the ensuing weeks, her Russian based hull underwriters rejected owners' 
notice of abandonment and owners themselves failed to comply with a directive 
from the port authorities issued pursuant to the Legal Succession to the South 
African Transport Services Act No. 9 of 1989 (1)to raise and remove her. Placing 
reliance on, inter alia, the pay to be paid rule, her protection and indemnity insurers 
felt disinclined to meet the costs of such an exercise. The result saw local salvors, 
Pentow Marine, being awarded a reportedly R2 million contract with the authorities 
for the righting, sealing and raising of the vessel.(21 Nevertheless, both owners and 
insurers had cause to consider the vexed question whether the expenses incurred 
by the Minister or authorities and referred to in the enabling legislation, would fall 
within one of the categories of liability in respect of which a shipowner is entitled 
to limit its liability in terms of Section 261 of the Merchant Shipping Act. 
On Saturday, 6th July 1996 at approximately 03hOO, the Berlize registered 
diamond recovery vessel, the "Big Red" ran hard aground on a heading of 
approximately 330 0 at approximately 6 knots on Penguin Island within the port 
limits of Luderitz, Namibia while returning to sea after replenishing stores, fuel and 
water during an unscheduled port call. Within days, the Namibian Ports Authority 
and in conjunction with the Ministry of Works & Transport, exercising the powers 
(1) and more particularly paragraph 11 of the Second Schedule thereto) 











conferred on it in terms of the Namibian Ports Authority Act, No.2 of 1994, issued 
a directive to the owners calling on them to remove the wreck forthwith. Her 
London based hull underwriters similarly rejected notice of abandonment tendered 
by her owners who, together with their P & I insurers, also had cause to consider 
the possibility of limiting their liability to the authorities in the event of the latter 
attending to the raising and removal of the wreck consequent upon their failure to 
do so. 
Liability for wreck removal expenses - statutory debt or damages? 
Section 304A of the Merchant Shipping Act, as amended, provides thus: 
"(1) (a) When a ship is wrecked. stranded or in distress within 
the territorial waters of or on or near the coasts of the 
Republic. the minister may direct the master or owner of 
such ship, or both such master and such owner, either 
ora,ly or in writing to move such ship to a place 
specified by the Minister or to perform such act in 
respect of such ship as may be specified by the Minister. 
(b) If the master or owner of a ship referred to in paragraph 
(a) fails to perform within the time specified by the 
Minister any act which he has in terms of that paragraph 
been required to perform, the Minister may cause such 
act to be performed. 
(2) The Minister may, notwithstanding the provisions of 
sub-section (1). cause any wreck or any wrecked. stranded 
or abandoned ship or any part thereof to be raised, removed 
or destroyed or dealt with in such manner as he may deem fit. 
(3) if the Minister incurred any expenses in connection with the 
exercise of any power in terms of sub-section 1 (b) or (2), the 
Minister may recover such expenses from the owner of the 
wreck or ship in question or, in the case of an abandoned 
wreck or ship, from the person who was the owner thereof 











A provision couched in similar terms appears in paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the 
Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act which reads as 
follows: 
"11 The Company shall be entitled-
(d) to raise, remove or destroy any sunken, stranded or 
abandoned ship or wreck within the area owned by tne 
l!ompany, to recover from the person liable in terms of this 
paragraph all costs incurred in such raising, removal or 
destruction and in lighting, buoying, marking or detaining [he 
ship or wreck and, on non-payment after written demand of 
such costs or any part thereof, to sell such ship or wreck and 
out of the proceeds of the sale defray such unpaid costs, 
rendering the surplus, if any, to the person entitled thereto 
and recovering any unpaid balance from the owner of such 
ship or wreck or from the person who was the owner of the 
ship at the time it was sunk, stranded or abandoned; and 
The provisions of paragraph 11 (d) apply to a casualty which is situate within port 
limits which is the area owned by the Company and referred to in that paragraph. 
There is thus some overlap between the empowering provisions .::onferred upon the 
Minister of Transport in the Merchant Shipping Act, on the one hand, i),d on 
Portnet in the Schedule to the Legal Succession to the South African iransport 
Services Act, on the other hand. It is submitted, however, that inasmuch as port 
limits fall within the territorial wC'ters of or ar'3 situate on or near the coast of the 
Republic (as referred to in Section 304A( 1 )(a) .:>f the Merchant Shipping Act) the 
Minister would similarly be able to exercise the powers conferred on him in terms 
of that Act in respect of a casualty situate within port limits. Interestingly, 
whereas the Minister is empowered to direct the owners to themselves remove any 
sunken, stranded or abandoned ship or wreck, the harbour authorities are not so 












The equivalent legislation In Namibia is couched in almost identical terms. Section 
304A of the South African Merchant Shipping Act enjoys the force of law in 
Namibia. In addition, S9ction 15 (3) of the Namibian Ports Authority Act confers 
upon the pert authority the power "to raise, remove or destroy any sunken, 
stranded or abandoned ship or wreck within the authorities' area of jurisdiction and 
to recover, in accordance with sub-section (3), the ccsts incurred in connection 
therewith. " 
Sub-section 3 entitles the authority when it has raised, removed or destroyed any 
sunken, stranded or abandoned ship or wreck pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph (d) of sub-section (11: 
"(a) to recover from the owner of the ship or wreck, or any other 
person who had the beneficial use of the ship at the time it 
sank or stranded or was ab:;ndoned, all costs incurred in 
such raising, removal or destruct!on, and in lighting, buoying, 
marking or detaining the ship or wreck; and 
(b) on non-payment after written demand of such costs or allY 
part thereof, to sell such ship or wreck and out of the 
proceeds of the sale to defray such unpaid costs, rendering 
the surplus, if any, to the person entitled thereto and 
recovering any unpaid balance from such owner or such 
other person." 
Wilereas it may, and often does, happen that the port authorities (usually the Port 
Captain) will issue a directive to the owners of a wreck to remove it under threat of 
in the event of their failing to do so the authority itself attending thereto on behalf 
of the owner and recovering the expenses from the owner, it would theoretically 
be possible for a shipowner to attack the legitimacy of this directive in that it is 
ultra vires the powers conferred on the authority in terms of the enabling 
legislation, I)"t in view of what is said above relative ",0 the duplicity of function 
between the Minister and the port authorities it would be futile for an owner to do 
so givf'n that the port authorities could merely prevail upon the Minister to issue 













There does not appear to be any South African authority dealing directly with the 
question of the applicability, if at all, of Section 261 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
in the context of wreck removal. However, there are a number of English 
decisions which, it is submitted, are of assistance and provide an indication of the 
direction that our Courts are likely to follow. 
Before reviewing the English cases, however, reference should be had briefiy to the 
case of South African Railways and Harbours v Smith's Coasters (Prop.l Ltd/3) 
which involved an appeal against the dismissal of an exception to the defendant's 
plea. The harbour authority (SAR&H) controlled and managed Durban Harbour. In 
October 1927 the "Karin" sank in the approach to the harbour. Her owners 
neglected to remove her. The SAR&H contracted with a third party for her removal 
and sued Smith's Coasters for damages in an amount in excess of £ 7000. 
Smith's Coasters pleaded, inter alia, that the damage suffered by the SAR&H was 
due to an occurrence which tool< place without their actual fault or privity within 
the meaning of Section 503(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 as amended by 
Section i of the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners & Others) Act 1900/4 ). 
In so doing they sought to reduce their liability to £ 3 002. To this defence the 
harbour authorities excepted as bad in law on the basis that the plaintiff was the 
Crown and that the proviSions of the Merchant Shipping Act relied upon did not 
bind the Crown. De Villiers CJ, on appeal, upheld the exception saying:-
" ... we have come to th!' conclusion that the contenticn is correct, and that 
the Crown is not bound by Section 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act. 1894. 
-rhe result is that the appeal succeeds" ./51 
Having reached this conclusion, the Court did not have to investigate whether in 
fact the liability which it was sought be limited was one which fell within the 
parameters of Section 503( 1) at all. In any event, it is submitted that this case will 
not assist a modern shipowner who seel<s to limit under Section 261 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act since the Act expressly binds the State to its provisions and 
no exclusions or exceptions are made in respect of Sections 261 to 263. 
/31 1931 AD 113 












In "The Mime", 1939 (Vol 64), Lloyds Rep 318 (Adm) the Court was asked to 
consider whether a shipowner was entitled to limit its liability in terms of Section 
503 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 as amended by the Merchant Shipping 
(Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act 1900, for expenses incurred by the 
Manchester Ship Canal Company in removing the wreck of the "Millie" which had 
sunk as a result of a collisior. and was constituting an obstruction in the canal. The 
Manchester Ship Canal Company had removed the wreck of the "Millie" from the 
canal in terms of the powers conferred upon it in Section 32 of the Manchester 
Ship Canal Act, 1936, which entitled the authority to remove the wreck of the 
vessel and further provided that:-
"(2) The Company may recover from the owner of any such 
vessel all expenses incurred by the company under this 
section in connection with the vessel ......... " 
The shipowners relied in part on Section 1 of the 1900 Act which provided thus:-
"The limitation of the liability of the owners of any ship set 
by Section 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, in 
respect of loss of or damage to vessels, goods, merchandise, 
or other things, shall ext~nd and apply to all cases where 
(witt-out their actual fault or privity) any loss or damage is 
caused ~o property or rights of any I<ind whether on land or 
on water, or whether fixed or movable, by reason of the 
improper navigation or management of the ship." 
Section 503 of the 1894 Act was in the following terms: 
"(1) The owners of a ship, British or foreign, shall not, where 
all or any of the following occurrences tal<e place 
without their actual fault or privity; (that is to say,) 
(a) Where any loss of life or personal injury is 










(b) Where any damage, or loss is caused to any 
goods, merchandise, or other things whatsoever 
on board the ship; 
Ie) Where any loss of lifp or personal injury is 
caused to any person carried in any other vessel 
by reason of the improper navigation of the ship; 
Id) Where any loss or damage is caused to any 
other vessel, or to any goods, merchandise or 
other things whatsoever on board any other 
vessel. by reason of the improper navigation of 
the ship; be liable to damages beyond the 
following amounts ... " 
41 
Mr Justice Langton rejected the shipowner's claim that it was entitled to limit its 
liability in respect of the wrer.:k removal expenses. Of relevance is that the learned 
Judge found that the expenses in question did not constitute "loss or damage 
caused to property or rights of any kind". In this regard it was held as follows(6):-
(6) at 321 
"It is evid·ently arguable that although expenses may not be 
loss or damage strictly so-called, equally the right of the 
Manchester Ship Canal Company to an unobstructed fairway 
has in thit cas  been interfered with. and it is no great 
stretch of language to describe the price of restoring that 
right as a form of loss or damage. The difficulty. hcwever. is 
to see how the loss or damage in question is caused to any 
property or rights. To state the matter as exactly as possible 
: the right of the Manchester Ship Canal Company is infringed 
by an obstruction : the removal of the obstruction causes '3 










company has thereby suffered any loss or damage. To 
illustrate the matter in legal language, the canal company in 
seeking to recover these expenses under its statutory rights 
is proceeding rather by way of a simple action for debt than 
by laying an action in tort against the shipowner." 
42 
In 1955 the House of Lords had cause to consider the question in the case of "The 
Stonedale No. 1".(7) A barge (the "Stonedale No.1") belonging to the appellants 
and which was under tow of the steam tug the "Warrendale" in the Manchester 
Ship Canal grounded and sank owing to the improper navigation by the tug 
owners' servants of the tug which was under the same ownership. No evidence of 
the tug owners' personal fault or privity was forthcoming. The canal company 
(respondent), having raised the barge at the request of its owr,ers, sought to 
recover the expenses of so doing under the Manchester Ship Canal Act, 1936 and 
more particular:y Section 32 (2) thereof. The resulting claim gave rise to a dispute 
regarding the right of the barge owners to limit their liability. The amount for 
which the appellants would have been liable if their claim to limit was well-founded 
would have been £ 1 681 2s 6d whereas tt1e Respondents had incurred 
expenses amounting to £ 7 609 1s 4d. The barge owners sought a declaration 
of limitation of their liability based on Sections 1 and 3 of the Merchant Shipping 
(Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1900 or, failing that, the provisions of the 
local statute (the Manchester Ship Canal Company Act, 1897). Section 1 of the 
1900 Act (which was repealed in 1958) provided that:-
"The limitation of the liability of the owners of any ship set 
by Section 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 ..... shall 
extend and apply to all cases where (without their actual 
fault or privity) any loss or damage is caused to property or 
rights of any kind, whether on land or on water, or whether 
fixed or movable, by reason of the improper navigation of the 
ship." 
(7) The Stoned!')l!') No.1 Rir:hnrd Abel & Sons Ltd, Owners of Dumb SlUga Stonedole No.1 v Manchester Ship Canel Co. 










Section 1 had to be read in conjunction with Section 3 which provided;-
"The limitation of liability under this Act shall relate to the 
whole of any losses and damages which may arise upon any 
one distinct occasion, although such losses and damages 
may be sustained by more than one person, and shall apply 
whether the liability arises at common law or under any 
general or private act of parliament and notwithstanding 
anything contained in such act." 
43 
The Manchester Ship Canal Company Act (which was amended in 1936) conferred 
on the canal company wide powers of removal of obstructions, and displays 
striking parallels to the South African Merchant Shipping Act and the relevant 
provisions contained therein. It provided the legal machinery for the canal 
company to obtain reimbursement of its costs by way of selling the wreck and 
recouping from the proceeds. It also purported to allow the owners of vessels 
becoming wrecks or obstructions in the canal, to limit their liability to a fixed 
calculable amount for any i •. iury or damage caused by themI8). 
In the Court of first instance, Mr Justice Wilmer considered the decision in the 
"Millie" and held that, whilst he was by no means satisfied that the reasoning of 
Mr Justice Langton was correct, he was obliged to follow that decision and 
accordingly held that the shipowners were not entitled to limit their liability. 
The barge owners' appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed I9 ). Lord Justice 
Singleton held that the shipowners were not entitled to limit their liability because 
the claim of the Manchester Ship Canal Company for the reimbursement of its 
expenses was not a claim for damages and accordingly Section 1 of the 1900 did 
not apply. The Judge stated as fo!lows:(10) 
(8) Hill at p 541 
(9) (19541 2 All ER 170 










"Under s. 32 of the Ship Canal Act, 1936, there is an 
additional step, viz., the giving of notice to the owner before 
the raising or removal of the vessel, on which counsel for the 
defendants submitted that the expense of removal was not 
damages resulting from faulty navigation, but was expense 
incurred by the defendants because the shipowner had net 
on notice ramoved his stranded vessel. I prefer to look on 
the case in this way. There is no claim for damages. The 
defendants' claim is in respect of an expense incurred by 
them under the terms of the statute, which gives them a right 
to recover, not damages, but expense in.;urred in performing 
their duty or obligation to keep navigation open. If the 
question is looked at in this way there is no conflict between 
the privata Act and the provisions as to limitation in the 
Merchant Shipping Acts. The section enables the defendants 
to recover from the plaintiffs all the expenses incurred. The 
plaintiffs cannot avoid a great part of their liabi!ity by saying 
that they were 0,.3Iigent in causing the original obstruction. A 
decision to the contrary might well result in the plaintiffs 
being much better placed if their vessel, sunl< through faulty 
navigation, was of considerable value, and they left the 
defendants to raise it and to return it to them. In my 
jUdgment, an amount payable under s.32 is not an amount of 
damages, and shipowners are not entitled to limitation in 
respect of the amount." 
Similarly, Mr Lord Justice Jenkinslll) stated as follows:-
"'t follows tl">at the plaintiffs, in order to succeed, must bring 
the case within s. 1 of the Act of 1900. That section is 












damages to which it extends includes damages in respect of 
any lo!'s 0' damage to property or rights of any kind caused 
by the improper navigation 01' management of a vessel. 
provided that there is no actual fault or privity on the part of 
the owners. no claim which is not a claim to damages can fall 
within it. I agree that. if a vessel was sunk or stranded in the 
canal through the negligence of those in charge of her. and 
the defendants brought an ae'lion for damages ilt common 
law in respect of the obstruction. her owners (provided there 
was no actual fault or privity un their part) could limit under 
the Act of 1900. The position may well be the same where a 
statute (eg. s. 74 of the Act of 1847) imposes. irrespective 
of negligencp-. a liability in damages on the owners of a 
vessel which does damage to the canal. provided that in the 
particular case the necessary conditions of improper 
navigation and absence of actual fault or privity on the part 
of the owners can be established. 
But a close consideration of s. 32 of the Act of 1936 leads 
me to the conclusion that the liability of the owner of a 
sunken or str~:;ded vessel under that section to pay the 
expenses incurred by the defendants in and about the raising 
and removal of the vessel is not a liability to damages at all. 
The object of the section is to enable the defendants in their 
own interests and in those of all users of the canal to secure 
that their navigation is I(ept clear of obstructions in the shape 
of sunken. stranded or abanaoned vessels and to cause this 
to be done either by and at the expense of any such vessel 
or at the option of the owner by the defendants at his 
expense. In the latter case the expenses incurred by the 
defendants. so far as not met by a sale of the salvaged 
vessel. are. according to the terms of the section. expressed 












When the dispute reached the House of L'Ads, which finally confirmed without 
critici5m the trial court's decision that the 1900 Act only allowed the limiting of 
liability where the liability was one for damages, whereas the canal company's 
claim on the facts and under the circumstances was for the recovery of a debt, 
Viscount Simonds was persuad"d by the reasoning of Jenkins, LJ whol121 had 
drawn attention to the anomaly which would result were the owner to exercise the 
option conferred on him in terms of section 32(3) of the Ship Canal Act of 1936 to 
itself raise and remove the vessel. It was stated that there had been no submission 
or contention to the effect that on the exercising of that option, the owner could 
claim any limitation of the expenses he him5;~lf incurred. If, however, limitation 
applied in the event of the owner electing to leave the raising to the canal 
company, while the owner had to pay the expenses in full if he elected to do the 
work himself, the option "becomes no more than a trap, and no prudent owner 
WCluid ever exercise it". Jenkins LJ also contemplated the situation arising 
vv;,ereby an owner would be able to i'scover a valuable vessel at the expense of 
the authorities to the extent of the difference between th& [...;11 "lnd the limited cost 
of raising it were limitation to apply. This the House of Lords <;tated had to be 
rejected as an "absurd result" and one which was "repugnant to justice and 
common sense"t13l. 
The House of Lords upheld the finding of the Court of Appeal that the claim by the 
owners did not come within the wording of Section 9 of the Manchester Ship 
Canal Act of 1897 which afforded owners an entitlement to limit their liability 
where a vessel caused any "injury or damage to the portion of the canal ,," 
without actual fault or privit\' of the owners". Referring to the decision in 
Workington Harbour and Doc!>. Board v Towerfield 55 (Owne[slt141 the Court held 
that these words were confined to damage which a vessel may do to the works 
which constitute the harbour, dock or pier(151 and did not cover tha lo~s incur;ed by 
the company in respect of its undertaking to clear the canalt16l. 
(12) at 1850 to H of the Court of Appeal Judgment 
t131 at 693F to G 
t141 11950)2 All ER 414 
(15) S6a the Workington judgment at p 443 











There have been other cases in which the harbour authorities have enjoyed a right 
to recover sums due to it in respect of wreck removal under a local statute without 
the shipowner being able to limit under the Merchant Shipping Acts. Limitation in 
respect of wreck-raising expenses became an issue in the "Berwyn".(17) On 15th 
February 1976, that vessel struck the Queen's North Training Bank near Taylor's 
Spit at the entrance to the Crosby Channel, as a result of which she suffered 
damage including holing, was taken in tow and later sank in Liverpool Bay. The 
plaintiff harbour authorities, in the exercise of powers granted by the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Act, 1894 which included the power to remove wrecks or 
other obstructions to the port, the power to sell the wreck and to recover the costs 
of wreck removal from the proceeds and, additionally, the right to recover any 
deficiency which may be outstanding ,m':! unsatisfied out of such proceeds from 
the party who owned the wreck at the time of ;;er sinking, stranding or 
abandonment, raised her. 
In further exercise of their statutory powers the Plaintiffs sold certain articles saved 
from the vessel for £ 225 which they retained to reimburse themselves in part for 
the cost of rem0.val, the balance of which amounted to £ 25 263.28. It was 
common cause that the casualty was the direct result of negligent navigation and 
neither party to the litigation atterr' ted to argue that the shipowner was personally 
at fault or that the harbour authority was not acting within the scope of its 
authority. The amount of the defendant shipowner's limited liability under the 
Merchant Shipping Acts, 1884 to 1974 was £ 19 163.47, Also included in the 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Act was a provision which purported to provide 
protection to the shipowner by way of imposing a maximum liability to the harbour 
authority of a sum not exceeding the amount specified in Section 503 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894(18) if he was not entitled to limit under the Merchant 
Shipping Act and its various amendments, The relevant Section 3(3) provided 
thus:-
(17) 1197712 Lloyd's Rep, 99, CA 










"If the proceeds of sale of the wreck of the vessel ... so ••• 
removed ••. are insufficient ... to reimburse the harbour 
authority '" they may recover the deficiency from the person 
who was the owner of the vessel at the time of the sinking .•• 
Provided that if the owner of the vessel so '" remover:! .•. is 
not under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 
to 1974 .•. entitled to limit his liability in respect of the said 
deficiency, that owner shall not be liable to pay ..• the sum 
exceeding the amount prescribed ... as the limit of the liability 
to damages of the owner of the ship in respect ... damage to 
•.. goods ... or other things." 
48 
The plaintiffs had based their claim on two separate and distinct causes of action : 
one based on the principle of fault, the other arising from a statutory debt which 
was not dependent on there being negli:lent navig tion. Their claim was to recover 
damages for negligence, on the one hand, and £ 25 263.28 being the balance of 
the removal costs, on the other. The shipowners argued that the authority had to 
elect on which of these two bases to proceed ,md that by reason of their election 
to claim for recovery of the statutory dtlbt, were precluded from claiming damages 
for negligent navigation. By virtue of the ":erms of the proviso to subsection 3 the 
shipowners contended that their liability under the Mersey Docks and Harbour 
Board Act was limited to £ 19 163.47(191. 
The authority submitted that to each of its two causes of action the shipowners 
had a separate and distinct defence. In respect of bott! the claim for damages and 
the debt they had a right to limit their liability to £ 19 163.47. The authority had 
the right, it contended, to enforce both claims cumulatively so long as the total 
amount recovered did not exceed the amount of the deficiency, namely 
£ 25 362.28(20). 
(19) see p101 col 2 











The question for consideration was the meaning 01 the words "his liability in 
respect of the said deficiency". Did it mean the liability imposed on the shipowner 
irrespective of his own or his servants' or agents' fault bv the first part of 
sub-section 3 to pay that net loss as a statutory debt? Or did it include the 
shipowners' liability to pay the sume amount at common law for the negligence or 
other actionable fault of his servants or agents?121) 
Counsel for the shipowner argued for the second and Wider conutruction, whereas 
the respondent authorities asked the Court to follow the narrower construction 
which was accepted. It was held that the words "in respect of the said 
deficiency" referred only to the liability of the shipowner in respect of any 
deficiency of wreck-raising and ancillary expenses imposed by statutory debt 
irrespective of fault and had no reference to any other liability for damages in 
respect of the same deficiency arising from negligence or other actionable fault. 
The harbour authority was entitled to plead both causes of action independently of 
the otherI22). It is clear from the preceding pages that the benefit of limitation is 
available in circumstances where damage has been caused by acts, omissior,s or 
defaults of the shipowner's servants in the navigation or management of tha snip, 
provided only that there was no actual fault or privity on the part of the shipowner. 
What emerges from this judgment most clearly is that limitation of liability as 
contemplated by the Merchant Shipping Act is bar. "d on the concept of fault, 
whe~eas a statutory debt which arises irrespective of fault is not a claim against 
which limitation w'.11 or can operateI23), 
In some instances, wrecl< removal expenses have been included as part of the 
claim of a shipowner for damages in a collision action and, being part of the claim 
for damages, have been subject to limitation. The case of the "Arabert" [1961]124) 
is a case in point: 
(21) see page 103, eel. 1 of tho judgmont 
1221 see 99. col, 2 
(23) sse Hill Maritimo Lnw, page 542 











On 23 December 1995 a collision occurred in the port of Newcastle; between the 
"Arabert" and the "Cyprian Coast as a result of which the latter vessel sank in the 
harbour. The "Arabert" was solely to blame for the collision and no question arose 
as to there being actual fault or privity on the part of the owners of the "Arabert". 
The Tyne Improvement Commission under a local Act(251 had the wreck raised by 
contractors and handed her over to her owners for removal and repair on the 
owner's undertaking to repay all COStS which the Commission had incurred. The 
owners of the "Arabert" brought an action for the right to limit their liability for 
damages !layable to the owners of the" Cyprian Coast", to the owners of the cargo 
on board that vessel and to all other persons enjoying claims against them arising 
from the collision. It was conceded by the owners of the "Cyprian Coast" that the 
wreck raising expenses would be part of their damages in ~ collision action which 
they in turn had brought and In which they had succeeded. There was thus no 
dispute about the liability of the "Ai'abert" to !lay damages, including the wreck 
raising expenses, or about the right to limit in respect of the liability to damages, 
other than in relation to the wreck raising expenses(261. The owners of the 
"Cyprian Coast" argued that the costs of repairs to their vessel were recoverable 
and should be the subject of limitation, where,,;,; the costs of restoring the vessel to 
the surface where she would be capable of being repaired would similarly be 
recoverable but should not be subject to limitation(271. 
The provisions of section 503(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 are cited 
above and reference should be had thereto once again. 
Placing reliance on the "Stonedale No.1" (supra). the "Urka"1281 and "The 
Cairnbahn"(29I, Lord Merriman concluded(30) that there had been "damage" to the 
"Cyprian Coast" as C' result of the improper navigation of the" Arabert" within the 
meaning of Section 503 of the 1894 Act. In other words, the Court held that the 
wreck-raising expenses constituted "damage" to the vessel within the meaning of 
Section 503(1 )(d) of the 1894 Act and, if this were not so, would constitute 
damage to the property of the owners of the sunken vessel and also to their rights 
within the meaning of Section 1 of the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners 
(25) Incorporating 9 56 and 9 74 of tho Harbours, Docks and Piers Clausos Act, 1847 
(26) at 385 F to H 
(27) at 389 E 
(28) (1953)1 i.loyd's Rep 478, Dltho\'Oh Lord Merriman opined thot this coso WIlS wrongly decided 
(2~1 [1~141 p,2~ a' p33 











and others) Act of 1900. Placing great reliance on the nature of the claim it was 
held that limitation of liability under Section 503 of the 1894 Act was app!icable in 
respect of such expenses when claimed as damages for negligence in a collision 
action against the ship at fault. The Learned Judge referred to the nature of the 
claim as being one which arose in tort because it was the "Arabert's" negligent 
navigation alone which caused the "Cyprian Coast" to sink, thereby causing 
damage to the Defendant's property and to their "rights" to her services as a 
ship(31). 
On the afternoon of 7th October 1996 a TaiwanesA trawler entering the Robinson 
drydock in the port of Cape Town reportedly(32) got stuck in reverse gear and tore 
across the Alfred basin damaging five fishing boats moored at the Concentra. One 
of the boats. the "Kingl<lip" sank after being damaged beyond repair. It would not 
be unrealistic to suspect that her owners were or will be on the receiving end of a 
directive from the port authorities to remove the wreck. 
The case of the "Arabert" could invite the owner of the Taiwanese trawler. if 
considered the negligent party. to delay in settling the claim for wreck removal of 
the sunken ship. It is clear tl,at if an owner of a sunken ship does not comply with 
a" order for wreck removal the authorities are be entitled to remove the wreck and 
claim the costs from the owner. If the sinking was caused by a collision with 
another ship. the owner who r aid {he costs of wreck removal can recover the 
costs from the other ship to the extent that liability can be attributed to that other 
ship. Givp.n the finding in the" Araf:ert" to the effect that the owne; of the "guilty" 
ship should be entitled to limit its liability in respect of the indemnity claim for the 
costs of wreck removal which the owner of the sunken vessel had fully paid. it 
would be far more favourable for that owner to wait until the owner of the sunken 
vessel has paid for the full costs of wreck removal with no limitation of liability. 
and then to settle the portion of the costs for which he is found to be responsible. 
subject to his entitlement to limit his liability. 
(31) .,395B'oC 











Wreck Removal. Limitation of Liability and the 1957 and 1976 Conventions 
The Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act of 1958 
significantly amended the nature of the limited liability available under Section 503 
of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. It provided: 
2(1) In subsection (1) of section five hundred and three of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894. the following paragraphs shall be 
substituted for paragraphs (c) and (d)-
(c) where any loss of life or personal injury is caused to any 
person not carried in the ship through the act or omission of 
any person (whether on board the ship or not) in the 
navigation or management of the ship or in the loading, 
carriage or discharge of its cargo or in the embarkation, 
carriage or disembarkation of its passengers, or through any 
other act or omission of any person on board the ship; 
(dl where any loss or damage is caused to any property (other 
than any property mentioned in paragraph (b) of this 
subsection) or any rights are infringed through the act or 
omission of any person (whether on board the ship or not) in 
the navigation or management of the ship, or in the loading, 
carriage or discharge of its cargo or in the embarkation, 
carriage or disembarkation of its passengers, or through any 
other act or omission of any person on board the ship;' 
and for the words "loss of or damage to vessels, goods, 
merchandise or other things", both where they occur in paragraph 
(i) and where they OCCUr ;n paragraph (ii), there shall be substituted 
the words "such loss, damage or infringement as is mentioned in 
paragraphs (b) and (d) of this subsection". 
Section 2(2) of that Act made provision for any occurrence giving rise to any 
obligation or liability arising in connection with the raising. removal or destruction 
of any ship which is sunk. stranded or abandoned to be treated as one of the 











provision was incorporated into 1958 following the wording of Article 1 (1 Hc) of 
the 1957 Convention which extended the right to limit to "liability imposed by any 
law relating to removal of wreck". However Section 2(5) of the i 958 Act provided 
that Section 2(2)(a) would not comp. into force in the United Kingdom until such 
day as the Secretary of State decreed by statutory instrument. No date was ever 
appoint'3d and accordingly this provision never became effective in the United 
Kingdom(33). 
Interesti.:gly Article 2(1 )(d) of the 1976 Convention included a provision confirming 
the right to limit in respect of claims for the raising, removal or destruction of a 
ship which had sunk, was wrecked or was stranded or abandoned. Article 2(1 )(d) 
makes provision/or limitation "whatever the basis of liability may be" and thus in 
theory envisages limitation being competent whether the wreck is removed under 
statutory authority or pursuant to a contractual right or duty, or where the claim 
sounds in damages. Just as the British government never brought the relevant 
provisions of the 1957 Convention as enacted by the 1958 Merchant Shipping Act 
into operation, so too has a reservation been made in respect of the British version 
of the 1976 Convention(34). Consequently, liability for claims for the cost of wreck 
removal remains unlimited insofar as the operation is performed pursuant to 
statutory powers. In this regard the preamble to Article 2(1 )(35) and the reservation 
made in respect thereof appear to be at variance WiTh each other in that the latter 
appears, by implication, to apply only to instances where a wreck is removed at 
the order of government or local authority(36). Conversely, if one takes the ordinary 
meaning of the opening words of Article 2 it is irrelevant as to what the basis of 
liability is when claims in respect of the raising, removal, destruction or rendering 
harmless of a ship form the basis of an action for limitation. There is thus some 
doubt as to exactly what is meant in this paragraph as the preamble envisages all 
those claims listed in Article 2 being subject to limitation whereas it is quite clear 
that a reservation has been made in respect of wreck removal expenses. It is 
interesting to note that P&I insurers, as a general rule. usually cover the risk of 
wreck removal expenses but only in circumstances where the removal is 
compulsorily requirl'd by order of a national or local authority acting pursuant to a 
statutory power. 
(33) see Griggs (boo:':) pago 22 
(34) soe paragraph 3 of Schedula 4. Part II of the 1979 MSA 
(35) ie. tho referencB to the words "whatever tho basis of liability may bo" 











At this stage, a brief consideration of what constitutes damages in South African 
law mlly be apposite. In this regard it should be borne in mind that the recovery of 
wreck removal expenses by the authority from a shipowner is not dependent on 
there being negligence or any wrongdoing on the part of the shipowner. 
LAWSA Volume 7, paragraph 16, defines damages by alluding to concepts such as 
the "reparation of a wrong" or the payment of a sum of money "in proportion to 
the wrongdoer's blameworthiness". 
In the case of Russell Lovedav NO v Collins Submarine Pipelines 1975 (1) SA 110, 
the Court had cause to consider whether a claim for the recovery of certain monies 
in terms of an insurance policy should be allowed. Clause 1 (c) of the relevant 
policy purported to indemnify the assured in respect of the following: 
"All other sums which the assured shall '" by contract or 
agreement become liable to pay in respect of claims made against 
the assured for damages 0'1 whatsoever nature." 
The facts of the case are not material to the present enquiry; suffice to say the 
question that arose was whether the assu,ed' s liability to a third party who was 
the other party to a building contract with the assured was one for damages. 
In argument reliance was placed l37) on the definition of -jamages given in Halsbury, 
Laws of England,138) which is as follows: 
"Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation which 
the law awards to a person for the injury he has sustained by 
reason of the act or default of another. whether such act or default 
is a breach of contract or a tort; or. put more shortly. damages are 
the recompense given by process of law to a person for the wrong 
that another has done him." 
137) at145G 











The Court did not criticise the accuracy of the above definition, and found that the 
sum claimed by the insured constituted "damages" because on the facts the sum 
was payable to the third party as the result of the insured's breach of contract or 
wrongdoing. By implication, it is submitted, had the Court accepted the argument 
that the sum claimed under the policy had been payable to the third party even if 
there had not been a breach of contract or wrongdoing on the part of the insured, 
the Court would in all likelihood have found that the sum claimed did not constitute 
"damages" and accordingly would not have been ciaimalJle in terms of the policy. 
We thus see in this case a heavy relian-.;e being placed on damages being a process 
of reparation or restoration of a patrimonial or non patrimonial loss arising out of a 
breach of contract or negligent wrongdoing. As noted above, it is quite clear that 
the circumstances giving rise to an authority's entitlement to claim wreck removal 
expenses from a shipowner are not dependent on either of those circumstances 
giving rise to the liability and accordingly wreck removal expenses cannot, it is 
submitted, be regarded as damages giving rise to an entitlement to limit in terms of 
Section 261 of the Act for expenses incurred by the Minister in terms of Section 
304A (2). (39) 
PETERMINATION OF THE !.IMITATION FUND AND THE VALUE OF THE GOLD 
FRANC 
As appears from Section 261 (4)(b) of the Act, quoted above, if a Court grants an 
Order entitling a shipowner to limit his liability in terms of Section 261 of the Act, 
it is incumbent upon that Court to determine the value of the gold franc used for 
the purposes of the calculation of a limitation fund in South African currency. 
Unfortunately, and as a result of the differences between the South African and 
English Merchant Shipping Acts as they presently stand, little assistance can be 
obtained from the English authorities. Prior to the amendment of the English 
Merchant Shipping Act in 1979 the value of the gold franc for the purposes of 
limitation was set in periodic statutory instruments, as was the case in South 
Africa prior to the amendment of the South African Merchant Shipping Act in 
1995. The English Merchant Shipping Act, 1979 gave eff0ct to the 1976 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims and introduced the Special 
(39) For B comprehensive review on the position in American low of wreck removal and a shipowner's right to limitation 











Drawing Right (SDR! as the unit to be used for the purposes of calculating the 
quantum of the limitation fund. Article 8 of the Convention states th!Jt the 
limitation amounts "shall be converted into the national currency of the state in 
which limitation is sought, according to the value of that currency at the date the 
limitation fund shall have been constituted, payment is made, or security is given 
which under the Ic.w of that state is equivalent to such payment." As noted above, 
the original British tonnage-based limitation statutes (Merchant Shipping Act 1854, 
1862 and 1894) fixed the limits at £15.00 or £ 8.00 sterling per ton. The limits in 
Article 3( 1) of the 1957 Convention were expressed in francs which were defined 
in Article 3(6) as being "units consisting of 65.5 milligrarnmes of gold of millesimal 
fineness 900". The system was based on gold values which were thought to be 
stable and uniform. However, as has been noted, when that proved not to be the 
case the international community turned to the Special Drawing Rights of the 
International Monetary Fund (lMF) which is a unit of account whose value is 
determined daily by the IMF on the basis of a number of currencies(40). 
A Protocol to the 1957 Convention was agreed on in December 1979 which 
conv6rted its gold franc figures into SDR. The protocol was brought into furce in 
the United Kingdom by Section 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1981, and entered 
into force on 6th October, 1984141 ). 
When amending its Merchant Shipping Act in 1985, South Africa did not follow the 
1979 Protocol. The determination by Government Notice 2515 contained in 
Government Gazette dated 25 November 1985 was as follows: 
i) <' Liability for damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury where 
no loss of or damage to property or rights arises:- limited to R432,00 
per ton. 
ii) Liability in respect of loss of or damage to property or rights where no 
claim for damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury arises:-
R139,00 per ton. 
(40) Sweet and Maxwell p37 











iii) Liability arises for damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury as 
well as in respect of loss of or dami:lge to property or rights arises:- an 
aggregate amount of R432,OO per ton with R293,OO per ton enjoying 
preference in respect of claims for loss of life or personal injury, with 
the unsatisfied portion of a claim for loss of life or personal injury 
ranking pari pasu with a liability arising in respect of loss of or damage 
to property or rights. 
Prior hereto(42) the limits of £ 15 per ton and £ 8 per ton were substituted by 
3100 and 1000 gold francs respectively with 2000 francs per ton enjoying 
preference in respect of claims for loss of life or personal injury over property 
damage claims. In 1985, these limits were reduced to 2635 gold francs and 850 
gold francs respectively(43). The limits in iii) above were reduced from 3100 and 
2100 to 2635 and 1785 gold francs respectively. 
By Government Notice dated 24th September 1993 the Director-General specified 
2635 francs as being equivalent to R552, and 850 gold francs as being equivalent 
to R178. 
in 1995(44) Section 261 was amended so that subsection 261(4) now reads: 
"(a) a gold franc means a unit consisting of 65.5 mg of gold of 
m!llesimal fineness 900; 
(b) the value of such gold francs in SA currency shall be 
determined by the Court seized of the case." 
Section 261 (5) was deleted in its entirety. It will be recall2d that subsection 5 
empowered the Secretary of Transport to specify the rand equivalent of the gold 
franc limits referred to in Section 261 {1 )(a) to (c). Thus, the 1995 South African 
tonnage limitation provisions left the "currency" of the calculation in gold francs 
but included a provision to the effect that the COllrt seized with the relevant 
litigation would have to determine the rand value of the gold francs on the basis of 
(42) as par Act No;.- 30 of 1959 which amended the MSA 
(43) as per Act 25 of 1985 
(44) as per the Transport General Amendmont Act No 16 of 1995 which appllared in Government Gao:-etto No 16524 dated 











evidence presented on the actual value of 65.5 milligrams of gold of millesimal 
fineness 900. The only clue that is given is that a gold franc is said to be 65.5 mg 
of millesimal fineness 900. 
To date there have been no South African Court decisions which indicate how 
these provisions are to be dealt with. The formula set out below thus constitutes a 
view of a possible, if not probable manner, in which a Court will make such a 
calculation. The calculation is dependent upon the gold price which is quoted in 
South Africa in United States Dollars. Accordingly, the calculation will vary from 
time to time depending on fluctuations in the gold price and in the rand/dollar 
exchange rate: 
On the assumption that the gold price as quoted relates to gold of millesimal 
fineness 900 and in circumstances where the gold price is quoted in United 
States Dollars, ascertain the price of 1 ounce gold in rand; 
Step 2 
Convert the price to 1 gram in rand terms (1 ounce = 31.104 grams and 1 
gram = 0.032 ounces) by dividing the rand price by 31.104. This will 
convert to the rand price of 1 gram; 
Step ~ 
Divide the price of ; gram by 1000 and multiply by 65.5. 
This will equal the rand price of 1 gold franc. 
Step 4 
Multiply the rand price of 1 gold franc by the gross registered tonnage of the 











The following represents a comparison of the tonnage limitation figures before and 
after the 1995 amendment(45): 
Claims for damages 
in respect of loss 
of life or personal 
injury as in (i) 
above 
Claims for damages 
in respect of damage 
to property as in 
(ii) above 
Pre-Amendment 
R 552.00 per ton 
USD 123.00 per ton 
R 178.00 per ton 
USD 39.50 per ton 
Post-Amendment 
R 9489.00 per ton 
USD 2109.00 per ton 
R 3 031.00 per ton 
USD 680.00 per ton 
Thus it will be seen that in the absence of a statutory determination of the rand 
value of the gold franc unit, practitioners, in advising shipowners facing claims in 
circumstances where they would be entitled to limit their liability, cannot with 
nearly as much degree of specificity as before advise their clients as to their 
maximum liability exposure. Coupled herewith is the question as to on what date 
conversion of the unit of account (as in the UK) or value of the gold franc (as in 
RSA) into the national currency of the country where limitation is sought should 
take place. In these times of widely fluctuating currencies, the answer to this 
question could make a great difference to the amollnt that one party has to pay 
and the other is entitled to receive. Article 8(1) of the 1976 Convention makes it 
clear when the conversion should take place in circumstances where a limitation 
fund has been constituted. However, what is the relevant date where no limitation 
fund is constituted? Article 8(1) of the Convention does not refer to the date on 
which the decree is pronounced. The only relevant date appears to be that of 
payment(46). 
Section 1 (3) of the UK Merchant Shipping Act of 1981 specifically provided that if 
no fund was constituted the date of judgment was to be the date of conversion(471. 
(45) based on prevailing SAR I USD exchange rate of R4.50 I USD 1.00 and USD 380-00 par ounco 
(46) Sweet and Maxwell page 38 











In the late 1960's, the English Courts had cause to consider this question in two 
cases, namely that of "The Mecca"(48) and "The Abadesa"(49). In both these cases 
the date for conversion was crucial as a statutory declaration changing the rate of 
the sterling equivalent of the gold franc was made after the date of collision giving 
rise to the limitation action but before the decree of limitation was made. 
In the case of "The Abadesa" the limitation claim arose from a collision in the River 
Scheidt between that vessel and the "Miraflores" as the result of which a third 
vessel, the "George Livanos" ran aground and was damaged in February 1963. 
Apportionment of liability was established in February 1967 but in February 1956 
the Plaintiffs (owners of the "Abadesa") had already commenced limitation 
proceedings. In November 1967 the pound sterling was devalued and shortly 
thereafter and also in November 1967 a new conversion rate came into force(50). 
In February 1968 a limitation decree was made in which the Admiralty Registrar 
applied the new conversion rate which produced a higher limit than the old 
conversion rate would have done. Mr Lord Justice Karminski at page 730 B said: 
"In my view the Order of 1967 meant that as from November 22 
1967, the Court had to convert int  sterling at the rate there stated. 
The Admiralty Registrar applied accordingly this rate at the time he 
made the decree of limitation, name;y on February 21. 1968. In my 
view he was right in so doing. and on this point the Plaintiffs' 
appeal must fail" . 
Similarly, in the case of "The Mecca" the Plaintiffs, the United Arab Maritime 
Company brought, a claim to limit their liability for damages in respect of a collision 
between their ship the "Mecca" and Blue Star Line Limited's ship the "Freemantle 
Star" which took place in the Gulf of Suez :n May, 1965. In February 1968 the 
Admiralty Registrar decreed that the amount of the limit of the Plaintiffs' liability 
should be ascertained by applying the conversion rate specified by the Merchant 
Shipping (Limitation of Liability) (Sterling Equivalents) Order of 1967. This was the 
new conversion rate for the conversion of gold francs mentioned in Section 1 of 
(48) (1968) 2 or ER 731 
(49) (1968) 2 or ER 726 











the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act of 1958 after the 
devaluation of the pound sterling. The Plaintiffs appealed against the determination 
of the Registrar on the basis that the Registrar should have applied the conversion 
rate that was applicable under the corresponding Order of 1958, being the rate 
applicable when the collision took place in 1965. The court applied the statutory 
Order or determination in force at the date when ascertainment was made (i.e. 
when limitation was decreed). but with the caveat that if a payment into Court was 
made at an earlier date it would be adequate if calculated in accordance with the 
statutory determination in force at the date of such payment. The dismissal of the 
validity of the decree made by the Admiralty Registrar had the result of fixing the 
Plaintiffs' liability for damages at £215 620.00 whereas had the earlier statutory 
determination been adopted they would have been liable only for a lesser sum, 
namely £184 816.00. 
The Durban and Coastal Local Division of the South African Supreme Court had 
cause to consider this question in the case of Nagos Shipping Limited v Owners. 
cargo laden on board the MV "Nagos" .1511 On 26 May 1993 the "Nagos" sank 
with loss of life and cargo some 15 nautical miles south of Cape St. Francis. 
Violent seas were said to have accounted for the disaster. The vessel had sailed 
from Richards Bay a day or so earlier where it had loaded a cargo of low ash coal 
destined for Antwerp. The cargo owners had sought and obtained an order for 
the arrest of 9 life jackets which had survived the sinking as security for their 
claims as owners of the cargo. It was these claims for the loss of the cargo that 
gave rise to an application by the owners of tho vessel for a declaration entitling it 
to the right, if any, in terms of Section 261 (1 )(b) of the Merchant Shipping Act, to 
limit its liability in respect of cargo claims to the equivalent of 850 gold francs per 
ton of the ship's tonnage. When the npplication was launched, the Rand equivalent 
of 2 635 and 850 gold francs had been fixed by the Director-Genera! of Transport 
in November 1985 at R432 per gold franc and R139 per gold franc, respectively. 
However, by the time of the hearing, those equivalents had been updated by the 
Government Notice of September 1993 to R552 and R178 respectively. In 
granting the declaration, the Court ruled that the rate fixed by the later notice 
applied for the following reasons:-











"In South Africa, the Director-General of Transport is seized of the matter: 
and it does no disservice, I feel, to the proper confines of judicial knowledge 
that in the present matter the shrinking value of the Rand underlies the new 
and increased values he has now determined. The argument is of course 
obvious. A claimant under section 261 should not be bound to a Rand 
equivalent of the gold franc which no longer represents its true value. The 
Act envisLges that changes can be called for. That is what has been done. It 
would be artificial in the extre.me, as I see it, that the shipowner should be 
entitled to rely on an obsolete Rand - gold franc conversion rate that no longer 
reflects its true value. The reasoning of Brandon, J (in the Mecca) is, with 
respect, entirely persuasive. The Director-General of Transport is not 
legislating retrospectively. He is determining a conversion rate in order to 
give proper substance to any limitation fund that may be set up. In my view 
the Applicant was well advised to put forward the alternative firmre of 
R6 582 796 based on the new values. "(52) 
It is submitted that some additional guidance as to the approach which a South 
African Court will be likely to adopt might be obtained by conSidering the South 
African Courts' attitude to damages awarded in a foreign currency. A.i a general 
rule, where a claimant is awc.rded damages in a foreign currency, the applicable 
date for calculating the South .·,frican rand equivalellt of the foreign currency is the 
date of payment: And so. for example, in the case of Barclays Bank of Swaziland 
Limited vs Mnyeketi(53) where the Plaintiff, a company of bankers incorporated 
under the Laws of the Kingdom of Swaziland brought an action for provisional 
sentence against the South African resident Defendant, one finds the Court 
entering provisional sentence against the Defendant for payment to the PI;:;intiff of 
an amount stated in the currency of the Kingdom of Swaziland, or "the equivalent 
in South African rands at the time of the payment"(54). Stegmann J chose to 
ignore the obiter dictum of Nestadt J in the earlier case heard in the same Division, 
namely that of Voest Alpine Intertradinq Gesellschaft MbH vs Burwil and Co SA 
(Pty) Limited(55) where it was held that the relevant date for conversion was the 
date when the damages were suffered as opposed to the date when the damages 
were quantified by judgment of the court, or at the rate of exchange on any other 
(52) ot 272 J to 273 C 
It Is of course no longer true that the Director-General of Transport is empowered to determine the mnd value of the 
gold franc, it now boing loft to the Court seized with tho matter. 
(53) 1992(3) SA 425 (W) 
(54) see page 438 A to B 











date. After having given lengthy consideration to the question as to whether in 
fact the Court had the power to enter Judgment for payment to be made in a 
foreign currency and ilaving considered the judgments in Malilang and Others vs 
MV "Houda Pearl"(56) and Murata Machinery Limited vs Capelon Yarns /pty) Ltd(57) 
the Learned Judge found that there was no general rule of common law or 
procedure which precluded the Transvaal Court "from giving judgment for payment 
of a sum of money expressed in units of any foreign currency, or its equivalent in 
South African Rands at the time of payment, when the relevant legal cbligation 
was incurred in a manner which contemplated quantification of the debt in such 
foreign currency"(58). 
In the case of Standard Chartered Bank of Canada vs Nedfin Bank Limited(59) the 
appellant bank which was incorporated under Canadian Law had sued the 
respondent bank which was incorporated under South African law for damages 
amounting to some USD2.5 million allegedly suffered by it as a result of its reliance 
upon a negligent misstatement allegedly made by the respondent. Having 
established that it was competent for a South Atrican Court to award delictual 
damages (as well as damages for breach of contract) in a foreign currency(60), it 
was held that the damages to be awarded in the present case should be expressed 
in United States Dollars as it was in that currency in which the loss was "felt"(6l). 
At 777 C - D Corbett, CJ said: 
"I accordingly conclude that the damages to be awarded in this case should 
be expressed in US Dollars. It is implicit in any Order to this effect that the 
Judgment debt may be satisfied in South Africa by payment in the foreign 
currenc:y or by the payment of its equivalent in rand when paid... Any other 
conversion date could render meaningless the award of the foraign currency". 
(56) 1986(2) SA 7141A) 
(57) 1986(4) SA 671 (e) 
(58) 8t 435 H to I 
(59) 1994 (4) SA 747 
(60) having placed hoavy rolianco on tho caso of thl! Dcgpinn R 1979111 All ER 421 (HLl and CIlSO of Malilnng Clod Othl'ts 
vs MV "Houdn Po,;,I". supra 












In conclusion and applying the abovementioned principles, should a shipowner 
institute a limitation action and should, as a result thereof a limitation fund be 
constituted, it is probable that the Court will apply the gold price prevailing as at 
the date of the constitution of the fund for the purposes of determining the South 
African rand equivalent of the gold franc limitation amount. Should the shipowner 
raise its right to limit its liability as a defence to a claim, and should that defence 
be succes&ful, it is submitted that a South African Court will in all likelihood apply 
the gold value prevailing at the time of the shipowner's payment of the limited 
amount of the claimant's claim. Although, as indicated above, Section 261 of the 
South African Merchant Shipping Act differs from the equivalent provisions in the 
English Merchant Shipping Act, a South African Court will undcubtedly take note 
of the provisions of the 1976 Convention as refe~red to above. 
CONCLUSION 
Diplomatic conferences usually take place in smoke-filled rooms. The conventions 
which emanate therefrom, although they are the product of hc;'jrs of intense 
debate, invariably present their own problems of interpretation and application. 
This work does not purport to be a detailed A to Z guide to limitation of liability but 
rather to create an awareness of some, if not all, 0'1 the circumstances in which a 
shipowner will be entitled to limit his liability. 
limitation is a question which plagues the minds of practitioners immediately upon 
the occurrence of an incident giving rise to liability. In fact, it touches just about 
every casualty. Passengers on the ill-fated "Achille Lauro" who lost goods worth 
thousands of rands when it sank almost two years ago, are still fighting for 
financial reparation, a battle which will be governed to a large extent by the 
provisions of the Athens Convention, for example. The international community has 
come a long way in reaching international uniformity. Although the oil regime and 
the emerging HNS regime suggest that perhaps limitation of liability can only 
survive when coupled with other schemes that ensure that in most cases claimants 
will receive full compensation which, in turn, would seem to suggest the erosion of 
the general limitation of liability, there can be no doubt that the inherent risks in 
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(I) Convention denounced, with effect from June 3fl, 1963. 
(2) Convention denounced, with effect from October 26, 1976. 
(3) By the notification of France. 
(4) Convention denounced, with effect from January 24, 1977. 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO THE LIMITA-
TION OF THE LIABILITY OF OWNERS OF SEA·GOING smps. 
SIGNED AT BRUSSELS ON OCTOBER 10,1957 
TilE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES 
Havc recognised the desirability of dctcrmining by agrecmcnt ccrtain 
uniform rules relating to the limitation of thc liability of owncrs of sea-
going ships: 
Having dccidcd to concludc a Convention for this purpose, and thereto 
have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
1. The owner of a sea-going ship may limit his liability in accordance with 
Article 3 of this Convention in respect of claims arising from any of the 
following occurrcnces, unless the occurrence giving rise to the claim 
resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner: 
{uj 1055 of life of, or personal iruury to, any person being carried in the 
ship, and loss of, or damagc to, any property on board the ship; 
{h) loss of life of, or personal ituury [0, any other persoll whether on 
l<1,ud or on waler, loss of or damage [0 any other properly or 
1nfc;,;gcment ohmy rights caused by the act, neglect or default of 
.,t'I)' pt:rs"'i un hoard the ship for whose act, ncglect or default thc 
:/wncl' is responsible or any person not on board tile ship for whose 
act, neglect or default the owner is responsible: Provided however 
that in regard to the act, neglect or default of this last class of 










the act, neglect or default is one which occurs in the navigation or' 
the management of the ship or in the loading, carriage or 
discharge of its cargo or In the embarkation, carriage or; 
disembarkation of its passengers; , ' 
(c) any obligation or liability imposed by any law relating to the 
removal of wreck and arising from or in connection with the 
raising, removal or destruction of any ship which is sunk, stranded 
or abandoned (including anything which may be on board such 
ship) and any obligation or liability arising out of damage caused to 
harbour works, basins and navigable watenvays. 
2. In the present Convention the expression "personal claims" means 
claims resulting from loss of life and personal injury: the expression 
"property claims" means all other claims set out in paragraph (1) of this 
article. 
3. An owner shall be entitled to limit his liability in the cases set out in 
paragraph (I) of this Article even in cases where his liability arises, without 
proof of negligence on the part of the owner or of persons for whose 
conduct he is responsible, by reason of his ownership possession, custody 
or control of the ship. . 
4. Nothing in this Article shall apply: 
(a) to claims for salvage or to claims for contribution in general 
average; 
(b) to claims by the Master, by members of the crew, by any servants of 
the owner on board the ship or by servants of the owner whose 
duties are connected with the ship, including Ihe claims of their 
heirs, personal representatives or dependants, if under the law 
governing the contract of service between the owner and such 
servants the owner is not entitled to limit his liability in respect of 
such claims or if he is by such law only permitted to limit his 
liability to an amount greater than that provided for in Article 3 of 
this Convention. 
5. If the owner of a ship is entitled to make a claim against a claimant 
arising Ollt of the same occurrence, their respective claims shall be set off 
against each other and the provisions of this Convention shall only apply 
to the balance, if any. 
6. The question upon whom lies the burden of proving whether or not 
the occurrence giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or 
privity of the owner shall be determined by the lex fori. 
Article 2 
I. The limit of liability prescribed by Article 3 of this Convention shall 
apply to the aggregate of personal claims and property claims which arise 
011 any distillcl occasioll without regard to any claims which have arisen or 
llIay arise 011 any other distinct occasion. 
2. When the aggregate of the claims which arise on any distinct occasion 










representing such limits of liability may be constituted as one distillct 
limitation fund. 
" 3. The fund thus constituted shall be available only for the paymellt of 
Claims in respect of which limitation of liability can be invoked. 
4. After the fund has been constituted, no claimant against the fllllli 
shall be entitled to exercise any right against any other assets of the 
~hipowner in respect of his claim against the fund if the limitation fund is 
actually available for the benefit of the claimant. 
A)'licle 3 
1. The amount to which the owner of a ship may limit his liability under 
Article 1 shall be: 
(a) where the occurrence has only given rise to property claims, an 
aggregate amount of 1,000 francs for each ton of the ship's 
tonnage; 
(b) where the occurrence has only given rise to personal claims, an 
aggregate amount of 3,100 francs for each ton of the ship's 
tonnage; , 
(c) where the occurrence has given rise both to personal claims and 
property claims, an aggregate amount of 3,1 00 francs for each ton 
of the ship's tonnage, of which a first portion amoullling to 2,100 
francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage shall be exclusively 
appropriated to the payment of personal claims and of which a 
second portion amounting to 1,000 francs for each. lOll of the 
ship's tonnage shall be appropriated to the payment of property 
claims; provided how.ever that in cases where the first portion is 
insufficient to pay the personal claims in full, the unpaid balance of 
such claims shall rank rateably with the property c1ailIls for 
payment against the second portion of the fund. 
2. In each portion of the limitation fund the distribution among the 
claimants shall be made in proportion to the amounts of their established 
claims. 
3. If before the fund is distributed the owner has paid in whole or in 
part any of the claims set out in Article 1 paragraph 1 he shall pro tanto he 
placed in the same position in relation to the fund as the claimant whose 
claim he has paid, but only to the extent that the claimant whose claim he 
has paid would have had a right of recovery against him under the 
national law of the State where the fund has been constituted. 
4. Where the shipowner establishes that he may at a laler date be 
compelled to pay in whole or in part any of the claims set out in Article I 
paragraph 1 the Court or other competent authority of the State where 
the fund has been constituted lIlay order that a. sufficient sum shall be 
provisionally set aside. to enable the shipowner at such later date 10 
enforce his claim against the fund in the manner set out in the preceding 
paragraph. 










accordance with the provisions of this article the tonnage of a ship ofless 
than 300 tons shall be dccmcd to bc 300 tons. 
6. The franc mentioned in this article shall bc deemed to refcr to a unit 
consisting of sixty-five and a half milligrams of gold of millcsimal fineness 
nine hundrcd. The amounts mentioncd in paragraph I of ihis Article shall 
be converted into the national currcncy of the State in which limitation is 
sought on the basis of thc value of that currcncy by refcrcncc to the 'unit 
defined above at the datc on which thc shipowner shall have constituteii 
the limitation fund, made the payment or givcn a guarantee which under 
the law of that State is equivalent to such paymcnt. 
7. For the purpose of this Convelliioll tonnage shall be calculated as 
follows: .' . 
-in the case or steamships or other mechanically propelled ships there 
shall be takcn the nct tonnage with the addition of the amount dcducted 
from the gross tonnage on account of cngine room sp~.ce for thc purpose 
of ascertaining thc net tonnage. 
-in the case of all other ships therc shall bc taken the net tonnage. 
Article 4 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 2 of this 
Convention, thc rulcs rdating to the constitution and distribution of the 
iimitation fund, if any, and all rules of procedure shall be governed by the 
national law or the State in which the funJ is constituted. 
Article 5 
I. Whenever a shipowner is entitled to limit his liability under this 
Convention, and the ship or another ship or other propcrty in thc same 
ownership has bcen arrcsted within the jurisdiction of a contracting State 
or bailor othcr security has been givcn to avoid arrcst, thc Court or other 
competent authority of such State may order the release of the ship 'or 
01 her property or of thc sccurity given if it is cstablishcd that the 
shipowner has already givcn satisfactory bail or security in a slim equal to 
the full limit of his liability undcr this Convcntion and that thc bail or 
other security so given is actually availablc for the bcncfit of the claimant 
in accordance with his rights. 
2. Where, in circulllstances mentioned in paragraph I of this Article, 
hail or other sccurity has a:{eady been given: 
(<I) al the porI wherc thc a<:cidenl gh'ing risc 10 thc claim occurred; 
(b) al Ihe first port of call after the accidcnt ii' thc accidcnt did not 
()CCu r in a port; 
(c) at Ihe port of discmbarkation or discharge if thc claim is a pcrsonal 
claim or relatcs to dallmgc to cargo; 
Ihe Court or other competcnt authority shall order the release of the ship, 
bail or othcr security given, subject to thc conditions set forth in 
paragraph I of this Articlc. 
3. Thc prm'isions of paragraphs I and 2 of this Artidc shall apply 










fullliJ!!it of liability under this Conventioll: Provided that satisfactory hail 
or other security is given for the balance. 
4. When the shipowncr has givcn bail or other security in a slim e'lual to 
the full limit of his liability under this COllvention such hail Ill' uthn 
security shall be available for the paymellt of all claims arisillg 011 a di~tinct 
occasion and in respect of which the shipowner may limit his liability. 
5. Questions of procedure relating to actions brought umlt:r the 
provisions of this Convention and also the time limit within which sudl 
actions shall be brought or prosecuted shall be decided ill accordance 
with the national law of the Contracting State in which the action takes 
place. 
Article 6 
1. In this Convention the liability of the shipowner includes Ihe liability of 
the ship herself. 
2. Subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, thcprovisiolls of this 
Convention shall apply to the charterer, manager and operator of the 
ship, and to the master, members of the crew and o!iler servants of the 
owner, charterer, manager or operator acting in the course of their 
employment, in the same way as they apply to an owner himself: Provided 
that the total limits of liability of the owner and all such other persons in 
respecr of personal claims and property claims arising on a distinct 
occasion shall not exceed the amounts determined in accordance with 
Article 3 of the Convention. 
3. When actions arc brought against the master or agail1st'member~ of 
the crew such persons may limit their liability even if the occurrence 
which gives rise to the claims resulted from the actual fault or privily of 
one or more of such persons. If, however, the master or member of tlH:, 
crew is at the same time the owner, CO-OlVner, charterer, manager 01' 
operator of the ship, the provisions of this paragraph shall only apply 
where the act, neglect or default in question is an act, neglect or defalllt 
committed by the person in question in his capacity as master or as 
member of the crew of the ship. 
Altiele 7 
This Convention shall apply whenever the owner of a ship, or any other 
person having by virtue of the provisions of Article 6 h<!rcof.the sallie 
rights as an owner of a ship, limits or seeks to limit his liability bdore the 
Court of a Contracting State or seeks to procure the release of a ship or 
other property arrested or the bail or other security given within the 
jurisdiction of any such State. 
Nevertheless, each Contracting State shall have the right to cxdude, 
wholly or partially, from the benefits of this Convention any 11011-
Contracting State, or any person who, at the time when he seeks to lilllit 
his liability or to secure the release ofa ship or other property arrested 01 
the bail or other security in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 










his principal place of business in a Contracting State, or any ship in 
respect of which limitation of liability or release is sought which does not 
at the time specified above fly the flag of a Contracting State. 
Anicle 8 
Each Contracting State reserves the right to decide what other classes of 
ship shall be treated in the same manner as sea·going ships for the;: 
purpose of this Convention. . 
Alticle 9 
This Convention shall be open for signature by the States represented at : 
Ihe tenth session of the Diplomatic Conference Oil Maritime Law. 
This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall 
be deposited with the Belgian Government which shall notify through 
diplomatic channels all signatory and acceded States of their deposit. . 
Article 11 
1. This Convention shall come into force six months after the date of 
deposit of at least ten instruments of ratification, of which at least. five by 
States that have each a tonnage equal or superior to one million gross tons 
of tonnage. 
2. For each signatory State which ratifies the Convention after the dat~ 
of deposit of the instrument of ratification determining the coming in~o 
force such as is stipulated in paragraph 1 of this Article, this Convention 
shall come into force six months after the deposit of their instrument of 
ratification. . 
Article 12 
Any State not represented at the tenth session of the Diplomatic 
Conference on Maritime Law may accede to this Conyention. 
The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Belgian 
Governmcnt which shall inform through diplomatic channels all signatory 
and ac(:eding Slales of the deposit of any such instrulllents. 
The Convcntioll shall come illto force in respect of the acceding State 
six months after the date of the deposit of the instrument of accession of 
that State, but not before the date of entry into force of the Convention as 
established by Article II, paragraph (1). 
Article 13 
Each lligh COlltracting Party shall have the right to denounce this 
COllvention at any tillle after the coming into force thereof in respect of 
such High Contracting Party. Nevertheless, this denunciation shall only 










received by the Belgian Govermnent which shall inform through 
diplomatic channels all signatory amI acceding States of such notification. 
Article 14 
1. Any High Contracting Party JIlay at the time of its ratification of Ilr 
accession to this Convention or at any time thereafter declare by written 
notification to the Belgian Government that the Convention shall extend 
to any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible. 
The Convention shall six months after the date of the receipt of stich 
notification by the Belgian Govcrnment extend to the territoriesillllllcd 
therein, but not before the date of the coming into force uf the 
Convention in respect of such High Contracting Party. 
2. Any I !igh CUl1lracting Party which has made a declaration under 
paragraph 1 of this Article extending the Convention to any territory for 
whose international relations it is responsible may at any time thereafter 
declare by notification given to the Belgian Governmcnt that the 
Convention shall cease to extend to such territory. This denunication shall 
take effect one year after the date on which notification thereof has been 
received by the Belgian Government. 
3. The Belgian Government shall inform through diplomatic channels 
all signatory and acceding States of any notification received by. it under 
this article. 
Alticle 15 
Any High Contracting Party may three years after the coming into force 
of this Conventioll in respect of such High Contracting Party or at any 
time thereafter request that a confercnce be cUllvened in order to 
consider amendments to this Convention. 
Any High Contracting Party proposing to avail itself of this right shall 
notify the Belgian Government which shall convene the conference within 
six months thereafter. 
Article 16 
In respect of the relations between States which ratify this Convention or 
accede to it, this Convention shall replace and abrogate the Internat ional 
Convention for the unification uf certain rules concerning the limitatiull 
of the liability of the owners of seagoing ships, signed at Brussels 011 the 
25th of August 1924. 
In witness whereof the Pleniputentiaries, duly authorized, have signed 
. this Convention. 
Done at Brussels, this tenth day of October 1957, in the. French and 
English languages, the two texts being equally authentic, in a single copy, 
which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Govefllment, 










PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE 
I. Any State, at the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to this 
Convention mOlY make any of the reservations set forth in paragraph 2. No 
olher reservation to this Conventiun shall be admissible. 
2. The following are the only reservations admissible: 
(a) Reservation of the right to exclude the application of Article 1 
paragraph I c); 
(b) Reservation of the right to regulate by specific provisions of 
national law the system of limitation of liability to be applied to 
ships of less tlmn 300 tons; . 
(c) Reservation of the right to give effect to this Convention either by. 
giving it force of law or by including in national legislation, in a 
form appropriate to that legislation, the provisions of this 
Convention. 
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instrument of acceptance. the text of which may be found by reference to 
the eMI Yearbook (1984/1985) at Pl" 91-95. 
(2) Originally by the accession of the United Kingdom. subsequelllly by 
succession on becoming an indepcndent state. 
(3) By the accession of the United Kingdom. 
(4) Egypt dcnounced the Cunvention. with effect from May 8. 1985. 
(5) Dcnmark. Finl:Ulfl. Norway an<l Sweden dcnounccd the Convcntion. with 
effect fmm Aplil I, 1!185. 
(6) Extendcd to Ncw Hebridcs from Uccember 8. 1966. 
(7) Including Berlin (Wcst). 
(8) japan dcnounccd the Convention on May 19. 1983. wilh effcct from May 
20. 198·1. 
(!!) By succession. maintaining the rcscrvations originally formulatcd by the 
United Kingdom. subscquently by indepcndcnt accession on july 7. 1978. 
(10) United Kingdom accedcd on bchalf of: Isle of Man. November 18, 1960; 
Ikrmuda. British Alllarctic Territorics. Falklaud Islands and Dcpendencies, 
Hong Kong. Gibraltar. British Virgin Islands. August 21, 1964; Guernsey 
and jcrsey, Octobcr 2 I. 1964; Cayman Islands. Montserrat, Turks and 
Caleos Islands, August 4. '1965. 
(1 I) United Kingdom denounced the Convention with effect from Deccmber I, 
1986. 
(12) Reportcdl), as a cOlISequence of thc cxtensionto the New Hebrides (see n. 6 
above). 
PROTOCOL OF 1979 AMENDING THE INTERNATIONAL CON· 
VENTION RELATING TO TilE LIMITATION OF THE LIABILITY 
OF OWNERS OF SEA·GOING SlIIPS. DATED OCTOBER 10, 1957. 
AGREED IN BRUSSELS DECEMBER 21,1979 
1. Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Convention is replaced by the following: 
"I. The amounts to which the owner of a ship may limit his liability 
under Article 1 shall be: 
(a) where the occurrence has only given rise to property claims an 
aggregate amount of 66·67 units of account for each ton of 
the ship's tonnage; 
(b) where the occurrence has only gi.ven rise to personal claims an 
aggregate amount of 206·67 units of account for each ton of 
the ship's tonnage; 
(e) where the OCCUlTence Ims givcn rise both to personal claims 
and property claims an aggregate amount of 206·67 units of 
account for each Ion of the ship's t.onnage. of which a first 
portioll amounting to 140 units of accouut f'.>r cach ton of the 
ship's tonllage shall be exdusivcly appropriated to the 
payment of personal claims and of which a second portion 
amounting to 66·6 units of account for each ton of the ship's 
tonnage shall he appropriated to the payment of property 
claims. 
Pmvided however that in cases where the first portion is insufficient 
to pay the personal claims in full. the unpaid balance of such claims 
shall rallk rateably with the property claims for payment against the 
se:ond portion of the fund." 











"6. The unit of account mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article is 
the Special Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary 
Fund. The amounts mcntioned in that paragraph shall be converted 
into the natiollal currency of the Stale in which limitation k sought 
on the basis of the value of that currency on the date 011 whkh the 
shipowncr shall have nmstillltcd thc Iimit.uion fund, nllHlc til(' 
paymcnt or given a guarantee which under the law of that State is 
equivalent to such payment. The value of the national currency, in 
terms of the Special Drawing Rights, of a State which is a member of 
the International Monetary Fund, shall be calcubted in accordance 
with the method of valuation applied by the International Monetary 
Fund in effect at the date in qucstion for its operations and 
transactions. The value of the national currcllI:y, in terms of thc 
Special Drawing Right, of a State which is not a mcmber of the 
International Monetary Fund, shall be calculated in a manlier 
determined by that State. 
"7. Nevcrtheless, a Statc which is not a membcr of the International 
Monetary Fund and whosc law does not permit the application of the 
provisions of the paragraph 6 of this Articlc may, at the time of 
ratification of the Protocol of 1979 or accession thereto or at any 
time thercafter, declare that the limits of liability provided for ill this 
Convention to be applied in its territory shall be lixed as (o\lows; 
(a) ill respect of paragraph I, a) of this Article, 1000 monelary 
units; 
(b) in respect of paragraph I, b) of this Article, 3100 monetary 
units; 
(c) in respect of paragraph I, c) of this Article, 3100, 2100 and 
1000 monetary units, respectively. 
The monetary unit referred to in this paragraph corresponds to li5·5 
milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness 900. 
The conversion of the amounts specified in this paragraph illto the 
national currency shall be made according to the law of the State 
concerned. 
"8. The calculation mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 6 of 
this Article and the conversion mcntioned in paragraph 7 of this 
Article shall be madc in such a manner as to express in the nalional 
currency of the State as far as possible the same real value for the 
amounts in paragraph 1 of this Article as is expressed there in units 
of account. States shall communicate to the depositary the manner of 
calculation pursuant to paragraph Ii of this Anicle or the result of the 
conversion in paragraph 7 of this Article, as the case IlIay be, when 
depositing an instrument of ratification of the Protocol of 197!J or of 
accession thereto or when availing themselves of the option provide!l 
for in paragraph 7 of this Article and whenever there is a change in 
either." 
3. Article 3, paragraph 7 of the COllventioll shall be relllllllhcred 
Article 3, paragraph 9. 
STATUS: Entered into force on October 6, 1984 
